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NUDGING PATIENT DECISION-MAKING 
Wendy Netter Epstein 
Abstract: Rational choice theory once pervaded the law. But we now know that 
individuals often make decisions that are not in their best interests. Many areas of the law 
have responded accordingly. The law of health care decision-making, however, has not. 
With limited exception, patients have the right to make their own medical decisions about 
their treatment, even if they make bad decisions. And there is ample evidence from the 
behavioral sciences that they do make bad decisions. Patients lack the stable preferences that 
the law assumes they will draw upon in making decisions, and they suffer from a number of 
systematic decision-making biases. Bad decision-making negatively impacts the individual, 
but also the entire health care system that must bear the cost of poor decisions. Patient choice 
nonetheless remains a hallmark of legal doctrine. 
This Article challenges the myopic approach that solely values autonomy to the detriment 
of well-being. It proposes that both doctors and patients instead be nudged toward the 
welfare-maximizing treatment choice by the establishment of a treatment default. A right to 
opt-out still protects autonomy, but the default will move most patients toward better 
decisions—those that data suggest will most increase patient well-being. We should no 
longer accept a regime that delegates the complex task of decision-making to often 
vulnerable patients without regard to their well-being. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that patients are entrusted to make decisions 
regarding their own medical treatment. This doctrinal choice seems to 
satisfy two goals simultaneously. It protects patients’ rights to self-
determination—to make personal decisions concerning their own bodies. 
It also assumes that well-informed patients will draw on their personal 
preferences to make the decisions that will be the best for them. The 
problem, however, is that ample evidence now suggests that patients 
often do not make the decisions that are best for them.1 Bad patient 
decision-making not only has consequences for individual patients, but 
also for the entire health care system, which bears the costs of those bad 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) (“There is 
simply too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are 
incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory.”). 
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decisions.2 Yet health care policymakers and lawmakers have so far 
remained steadfast in their commitment to the status quo. 
Many other areas of the law started in the same place, putting similar 
trust in individual decision-making. But when it became clear that fully 
informed individuals frequently did not act as theory anticipated, the law 
responded.3 In some areas, that meant regulating away choices that 
people should not make. Traditional contract law assumed that rational 
parties would only enter into contracts that would make them better off. 
When flaws in the assumption were revealed, modern contract law 
responded with the ascendancy of doctrines like unconscionability and 
with regulations to protect people from their own bad choices.4 For 
instance, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act of 2009 prevents consumers from entering into contracts with credit 
card companies that would ultimately be welfare-reducing.5 
And where paternalistic measures were criticized as government 
coercion, libertarian paternalism emerged as a compromise.6 
Policymakers began to use tools to shape individuals’ choices, making it 
more likely that an individual would select the best option, without 
mandating such a choice. One example is the strategic use of defaults. 
Because defaults are sticky—meaning that choosers tend to remain in 
the default position even if they would not have actively chosen it—
policymakers now frequently select defaults that will make most 
individuals better off. The assumption is that few will opt-out, although 
defaults preserve their option to do so.7 In consumer finance, some 
mortgages are now structured such that escrowing taxes and insurance—
to ensure that individuals have sufficient funds put aside to make those 
payments when they come due—is the default. Consumers may choose 
                                                     
2. See, e.g., infra notes 170–72 and accompanying text (discussion of overtreatment problem in 
the United States, which is costing the United States $210 billion per year). 
3. See infra section III.B. 
4. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); 
Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law: Legal Reform in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 780–83 (2015) (quoting E. of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 82, 100 (1750)) (explaining that the doctrine of unconscionability originated in response to 
individuals voluntarily entering into contracts “that ‘no man in his senses and not under delusion 
would make’”); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1129, 1174 (1986).  
5. See, e.g., Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also infra section III.B.  
6. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH, 
HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 9–11 (2008) (arguing for a form of libertarian paternalism) [hereinafter 
NUDGE]. 
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013).  
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to opt-out after the first year, but by making “opt-in” the default, the 
result is that many more individuals are protected from the consequences 
of failure to pay. Having the protection is in most individuals’ best 
interests.8 Many legal fields, including property law and criminal law, 
have also responded to evidence that human decision-making often does 
not produce optimal results, either by regulating or by “nudging”9 to 
more desirable decisions.10 
The law of health care decision-making has not followed suit—but it 
should. While the entrenched doctrine seems to respond to both concerns 
about patient autonomy and patient well-being, evidence from the 
behavioral sciences suggests it is a ruse.11 Patient choice may further the 
value in self-determination—although there is reason to even question 
that12—but the law’s reliance on patient choice as a dependable proxy 
for patient well-being is highly flawed. 
Patients suffer from a number of systematic decision-making biases 
that will often prevent them from choosing treatment options that will 
most increase their own well-being.13 In particular, research from the 
emerging field of hedonic psychology has shown that people exhibit 
substantial “affective forecasting errors” that lead them to erroneous 
predictions about how future experiences will make them feel.14 An 
                                                     
8. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3) (2016); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1229 (2013) (discussing the use of other defaults intended to nudge 
behavior in consumer finance). 
9. See NUDGE, supra note 6 (arguing policymakers should mitigate cognitive bias by framing 
choices in ways that help people act in their own self-interest, otherwise known as nudges). 
10. See infra section III.B. 
11. In some sense, patient well-being is akin to the principle of “beneficence” or of “welfare.” A 
broad, inclusive definition of well-being (to include the concepts of beneficence and welfare) is 
intentionally used here. See infra section I.B. 
12. A choice is not truly autonomous if it is dependent on decision frames. See infra section II.A. 
Also, some people prefer not to have to make such decisions, and current law does not permit that 
choice. See Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1 (2014) (noting that many 
people prefer not to make choices about their health). 
13. See George Loewenstein, Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making, 25 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 96, 98, 103–04 (2005); Michael L. Kelly, Risk Perception, Bias, and the Role of the 
Patient-Doctor Relationship in Decision Making About Cerebral Aneurysm Surgery, 17 AMA J. 
ETHICS 6, 7 (2015) (“[C]ognitive biases and decision-making heuristics strongly influence decision 
making for both patients and physicians.”). 
14. Research on hedonic psychology is increasingly applied to legal issues, including tort law, 
criminal law, and administrative law. See generally JOHN BRONSTEEN, CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO, 
& JONATHAN S. MASUR, HAPPINESS AND THE LAW (2015); LAW AND HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & 
Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010). 
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individual might think life is over if a limb is lost, but in fact, most 
people adapt well in such circumstances.15 
Perhaps most profound, the research in this area has brought into 
question whether most patients even have stable preferences that they 
draw from in making health care decisions. Consider that if you have a 
preference for apples over oranges and are asked to choose whether you 
would prefer to eat an apple or an orange, you may be able to answer 
that question relatively easily to satisfy your preference for apples. But 
in health care, most people do not have engrained preferences for things 
like whether to amputate a limb or prolong life.16 Rather, their 
preferences are constructed largely by the decision-making frame in 
which they are presented.17 What appears to be autonomous choice is 
really not. The patient’s choice is unwittingly undermined by cognitive 
limitations and framing effects. 
This Article urges a fundamental re-examination of the law of health 
care decision-making on this basis—the recognition that patients often 
do not make decisions in their own best interests. We should not 
delegate the complex task of health care decision-making to vulnerable 
patients without concern for their well-being if we know those patients 
are likely to make bad decisions. 
What should we do instead of just letting patients choose? One option 
is hard paternalism—the law could simply regulate and force patients to 
make the decisions that are best for them. But given the deeply personal 
nature of health care, and the importance of protecting patients’ rights to 
self-determination, outright paternalism seems a bad fit. Indeed, the 
health law field has seen strong opposition to paternalism in recent years 
in the medical marijuana and “right to try”18 movements. 
Instead, health care decision-making presents a classic example where 
both pure autonomy and hard paternalism are problematic. This Article 
argues that the middle ground of libertarian paternalism offers the best 
solution. Specifically, it urges a decision-making “nudge” that responds 
                                                     
15. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 764 (2007). 
16. See, e.g., Linda Brom et al., Patients’ Preferences for Participation in Treatment Decision-
Making at the End of Life: Qualitative Interviews with Advanced Cancer Patients, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 
4–7 (2014).  
17. See NUDGE, supra note 6. 
18. See, e.g., Julie Turkewitz, Patients Seek ‘Right to Try’ New Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/us/patients-seek-right-to-try-new-drugs.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/3QBM-RWDS] (describing the recent wave of states passing laws that permit 
critically ill patients the right to try medications that have not been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration with the goal of promoting patient choice). 
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to the problem of bounded rationality while preserving a sense of 
autonomy.19 Physicians, who themselves are biased decision-makers, 
should be required to present the welfare-maximizing treatment choice 
to patients as the default. Patients should be permitted to opt out of that 
default, but because defaults are sticky, the expectation is that most 
patients will be nudged toward the option that will be the best for them.20 
It will be difficult to determine where to implement a default, and then 
how to select the default that will most maximize any individual 
patient’s well-being. But these problems are not unsolvable, particularly 
as outcome data becomes more personalized21 and hedonic data—
helpful to predicting future well-being—becomes more readily 
available.22 
Just as the breakdown of rational choice theory has already brought 
about changes to other areas of the law, the same sorts of changes are 
also appropriate—and perhaps even more so—in health law, where 
patients are particularly vulnerable and decision-making is a particularly 
complex endeavor. The law can no longer blithely accept that allowing 
patients to make informed choices about their treatment will tend to 
make them better off, even if we give them decision aids and other tools 
in an attempt to de-bias them.23 
Part I of this Article explores the values of autonomy and well-being 
in health care decision-making and explains how autonomy has come to 
dominate the law of patient decision-making, both in scholarship and in 
informed consent doctrine. Part II then sets out the problem. Despite the 
law’s reliance on patient choice, substantial literature on decision-
making heuristics and biases undermines the notion that patients’ 
choices are strongly correlated with increased patient well-being. It also 
calls into question the assumption that patients even have stable 
preferences to draw upon that are not constructed simply by the 
decision-making frame in which they are presented. Part III explores the 
concept of choice architecture, with specific emphasis on the stickiness 
                                                     
19. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 413 (2015) 
(discussing the ways in which nudges promote autonomy).  
20. See infra section III.A for discussion of the stickiness of defaults. 
21. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through 
Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011) (discussing how “electronic queries of a large electronic health 
record (EHR) database” permit medical professionals to “summarize the outcomes of available 
treatments administered to patients with similar clinical characteristics”). 
22. See infra section IV.B for discussion of the data available to guide selection of defaults, 
which is not perfect but is evolving. 
23. See infra section II.D for discussion of the limitations of debiasing efforts. 
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of defaults and the use of decision simplification tools. Finally, Part IV 
introduces the specific suggestion for reform—a type of decision 
simplification mechanism to move patients toward better choices, while 
respecting autonomy. It concedes a variety of concerns about employing 
a nudge, including the paternalistic, coercive power of nudges and the 
inherent difficulty in setting the default. But it concludes that the unique 
nature of health care decision-making, combined with the collection of 
quality data to help predict welfare-enhancing treatment choices, 
justifies a nudge in this context. 
I. THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
AUTONOMY AND WELL-BEING 
Every day, patients are asked to make very difficult decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty. Imagine a fifty-five-year-old woman who has 
been living with chronic, debilitating pain in her lower back caused by 
degenerative changes in her spine. Her doctor proposes spinal fusion 
surgery to join vertebrae in the problematic region. It is a major surgery 
with a long recovery period.24 Her doctor also mentions the option to 
undergo intense physical therapy instead of surgery. The patient must 
decide whether to have the surgery, which has very mixed rates of 
success, but which the doctor nonetheless prefers, or to try the less 
invasive physical therapy. 
Or perhaps there is a sixty-nine-year-old man who completes a 
routine treadmill exercise test at his yearly exam, the results of which 
suggest coronary artery disease. A follow-up diagnostic test finds 
narrowing of his coronary artery. He is active and has no symptoms. His 
doctor recommends, as a preventative measure, that he have his 
narrowed artery propped open with a stent—a small metal mesh tube. 
This option appeals to the patient’s desire to address the problem rather 
than feel like a ticking time bomb. However, the evidence suggests that 
almost a third of stents that are placed may be unnecessary.25 He must 
decide whether to have the stent placed or to instead make lifestyle 
changes or try medication therapy.26 
                                                     
24. See Roger Chou et al., Interventional Therapies, Surgery, and Interdisciplinary 
Rehabilitation for Low Back Pain: An Evidence-Based Clinical Practice Guideline from the 
American Pain Society, 34 SPINE 1066 (2009); Brook I. Martin et al., Expenditures and Health 
Status Among Adults with Back and Neck Problems, 299 JAMA 656 (2008).  
25. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
26. See generally Grace A. Lin & R. Adams Dudley, Fighting the “Oculostenotic Reflex,” 174 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1621 (2014).  
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Health care decision-making, as these examples demonstrate, is often 
complicated.27 It implicates various patient interests and reflects a series 
of complex trade-offs, even when considered only from the patient’s 
perspective.28 Should a patient choose a riskier procedure that may lead 
to the best possible outcome but with the greatest potential side effects, 
or the safer option where the patient knows the outcome will not be 
ideal? How should a patient choose between the psychological burden of 
a wait-and-see approach versus the potential complications and cost of a 
serious surgery? How does a patient weigh the cost in taking extended 
time away from work for recovery against a longer-term reduction in 
ability from not acting? 
Health care decisions are not only complicated due to the range of 
factors that must be considered, but sometimes because of the competing 
values such decisions produce. Of the long list of values that patients 
and the law might prioritize in making these decisions, patient well-
being and patient autonomy are of primary importance.29 In the last half-
century of legal and policy scholarship on health care decision-making, 
patient autonomy has come to dominate the discourse, in part because it 
has been considered a proxy for well-being.30 The next subparts discuss 
the autonomy and well-being values and describe how the autonomy 
value drives the doctrinal choice in informed consent law. 
                                                     
27. This is particularly so for preference-sensitive care—care for which treatment alternatives 
exist, and there is no universally agreed-upon medical choice. See John E. Wennberg & Philip G. 
Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine 
Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2002). For preference-
sensitive care, the alternatives have different risks and benefits about which individuals may have 
heterogeneous preferences, if they have preferences at all. Id.; see also Anna B. Laakmann, When 
Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 913, 923 (2015). 
28. This Article sets aside issues related to health care costs, insurance, and appropriate 
incentives for physicians. For discussion of these issues, see generally Wendy Netter Epstein, 
Revisiting Incentive-Based Contracts, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2017). 
29. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994); 
Stephanie Alessi Kraft et al., Research on Medical Practices and the Patient-Physician 
Relationship: What Can Regulators Learn from Patients?, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 1160, 1160–65 
(2015); Erin Sheley, Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent, 2015 BYU L. REV. 63, 63 
(2015). 
30. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for 
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 431 (2006); Nadia N. Sawicki, 
Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
821, 827 (“The doctrine of informed consent is grounded in the ethical principle of patient 
autonomy.”); see, e.g., Kraft et al., supra note 29, at 1160–65; Schuck, supra note 29, at 924; 
Sheley, supra note 29, at 63. 
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A. The Autonomy Value in Health Care Decision-Making 
The autonomy value as a general matter is firmly engrained in 
Western society. Autonomy means the ability to make one’s own 
decisions and to live one’s life as one chooses, without the effect of 
distorting or manipulating sources.31 Autonomy has its roots both in the 
Kantian tradition of moral philosophy and in John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarian liberalism. 
According to Kant, autonomy means “self-rule.”32 It is the power to 
act, utilizing one’s inherent rationality through freedom of choice,33 and 
to engage in independent decision-making.34 Autonomy is important 
because it is essential to personhood. Government is justified, in part, by 
its role in protecting the autonomy of its citizens.35 Kant’s autonomy is 
universal. Everyone has it, and it is to be valued, regardless of 
differences in capacity.36 
For Mill, autonomy is “one of the elements of well-being.”37 It 
enables a person, acting according to his own inclinations and 
judgments, to become “a noble and beautiful object of contemplation” 
and enables his life to become “rich, diversified, and animating.”38 He 
becomes more valuable to himself, and therefore, more valuable to 
others. Thus, society protects its own interest when it cultivates a 
person’s individuality.39 In arguing for the importance of autonomy and 
against paternalism, Mill argues that individuals know their own 
interests and preferences better than others. Therefore, unless an 
individual’s decision will cause harm to others, the state should not 
interfere in individual decision-making.40 
                                                     
31. John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ [https://perma.cc/R986-7BBL]. 
32. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals § 4:439, in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 41, 88 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1785). 
33. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, In Defense of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
548, 555 (2008). 
34. Id.; see generally Paul Guyer, Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 20 SOC. PHIL. 
& POL’Y 70 (2003). 
35. Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 165–69 (1997). 
36. See Kant, supra note 32. 
37. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 52 (E. Alexander ed., 1999) (1859). 
38. Id. at 59. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 69–70. 
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The idea of autonomy figures heavily in many aspects of the law.41 
Particularly in matters concerning health, autonomy is considered to be 
of great importance. Decisions about one’s health are highly personal 
and, most scholars argue, affect the person making the decision rather 
than society more generally.42 A common sentiment is that “[f]ew if any 
choices are more private and intimate than those that concern the use 
made of one’s own body.”43 
Autonomy in health care decision-making is synonymous with the 
idea of patient choice. It is often valued for deontological reasons. In 
other words, the right to self-determination is valuable in and of itself.44 
Even if patients use their autonomy to make poor decisions, having the 
autonomy to make the decision is itself a good thing. When it comes to 
medical decision-making specifically, scholars have long argued that as 
long as patients do not cause harm to others, they should be permitted to 
choose what is best, even if they choose poorly.45 Regardless of the 
outcome, the patient feels better about the decision for having made it.46 
B. The Well-Being Value in Health Care Decision-Making 
But it is not only the act of choosing that may be important. The 
outcomes of that choice and how that choice bears on an individual’s life 
also demand substantial consideration.47 Well-being refers to how well a 
person’s life goes according to a chosen measure, such as satisfaction 
with one’s life or an individual’s happiness.48 It is an instrumental 
                                                     
41. Id.; see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994); 
DAVID B. MATCHAR & GREG P. SAMSA, Linking Modeling with Health Policy Formation and 
Implementation in Decision-Making, in HEALTHCARE: THEORY, PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS 
145 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. Sonnenberg eds., 2003). 
42. The clear exception, here, is matters of public health. Also consider systemic problems 
resulting from individual decisions, like the epidemic of unnecessary care that has contributed to 
ballooning health care costs in the United States. See infra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
43. Schuck, supra note 29, at 924.  
44. See Sawicki, supra note 30. 
45. Schuck, supra note 29, at 924–26. This is the same argument made in support of the medical 
marijuana and right to try movements. See, e.g., Turkewitz, supra note 18. 
46. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 734–35 (2011) (“An important thread of the literature suggests that there is a dignitary 
benefit to receiving information even if you do not use it.”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 12 (some 
people would actually feel better not to have to make the decision at all).  
47. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
12 (6th ed. 2009). 
48. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
971 (2001).  
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value—meaning that it is a means to an end. What matters is that well-
being is maximized. 
Concern for an individual’s well-being is historically aligned with the 
utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. According to Bentham, the 
most important goal for the state was maximizing the utility of its 
citizens, where utility was understood as the relative relationship 
between pleasure and pain.49 On Bentham’s view, a person’s life had 
greater well-being the greater the ratio of happiness to suffering that the 
person experienced.50 
In the context of health care decision-making, policymakers typically 
focus on physical outcomes of treatment, most commonly morbidity and 
mortality data.51 But such measures are only part of the broader idea of 
patient welfare in the sense of subjective well-being.52 The idea of well-
being captures how people perceive their lives are going and therefore 
represents satisfaction with life and the presence of positive emotions 
and moods such as contentment and happiness.53 
                                                     
49.  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
12–13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789) (“An action then may be said to be 
conformable to the principle of utility . . . (meaning with respect to the community at large) when 
the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish 
it.”); see also PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 14 (2d ed. 1993) (articulating an interest-based 
theory of utility). 
50. BENTHAM, supra note 49, at 13.  
51. Well-Being Concepts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 22, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/wellbeing.htm [https://perma.cc/J6ES-C58Q]. 
52. See, e.g., Quality Measures and Performance Standards, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ 
sharedsavingsprogram/Quality_Measures_Standards.html [https://perma.cc/777X-TE2V] (defining 
metrics to measure health quality).  
Note that the terms “well-being” and “welfare” are often used interchangeably in the literature, 
and this Article treats them as essentially synonyms, although a distinction may be drawn between 
well-being, which connotes an affective state, and welfare, which does not. “Welfare” has a 
secondary meaning in the United States referring to a collection of government programs such 
intended to help the poor, but that is not the sense in which “welfare” is used here. Wellbeing and 
Welfare, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/ 
wellbeingandwelfare.html [https://perma.cc/WT33-D7ML].  
53. See, e.g., ED DIENER ET AL., WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2009); BRUNO S. FREY & A. 
STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS (2002); Ed Diener & William Tov, National Accounts of 
Well-Being, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL INDICATORS AND QUALITY OF LIFE RESEARCH 137, 137 
(Kenneth C. Land, Alex C. Michalos & M. Joseph Sirgy eds., 2012) (“Subjective well-being is 
known colloquially as ‘happiness’ and refers to the various ways in which people evaluate their 
lives positively. . . . In terms of conscious thought, it involves judging life to be satisfying and 
fulfilling.”). 
Although this Article adopts the view that subjective well-being provides the best account of 
human welfare, one need not agree to still believe that the ability to measure subjective well-being 
still provides important information about welfare. Virtually all theories of welfare treat subjective 
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It may be the case that a good physical outcome and a patient’s well-
being are synchronous. But one could also imagine situations where an 
outcome is considered “good” by traditional medical standards, but a 
patient is nonetheless unhappy. Consider the cancer patient who beats 
the odds and lives ten years longer than expected, but because of the side 
effects from treatment, the patient’s quality of life is so poor that the 
patient is unhappy. That patient may have positive health outcomes but 
negative well-being. As a result, the concept of well-being is purposely 
broader than physical outcomes alone.54 
Maximizing well-being requires being able to identify what outcomes 
will make people happier—but it is hard for policymakers to do so 
without being able to measure internal mental states.55 The difficulty in 
measuring and predicting well-being, in part, caused the autonomy value 
in health care decision-making to gain favor.56 
C. History of the Informed Consent Doctrine and Emergence of the 
Autonomy Value as Predominant 
Health care decision-making is legally governed by the doctrine of 
informed consent. The doctrine evolved largely in response to backlash 
against a more paternalistic system and difficulties in designing a system 
to prioritize patient well-being. As a result, informed consent doctrine is 
now firmly rooted in a concern for patient autonomy. 
1. Paternalism Once Dominated Health Care 
For much of their history, health care law and policy were deeply 
paternalistic.57 In a paternalistic system, physicians make decisions for 
                                                     
happiness as an important constituent, so understanding how treatments make people feel will be 
important under any definition of welfare. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan 
S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1590 (2010) (discussing the role of subjective 
well-being in welfare theories). 
54. For further discussion of outcome data and hedonic data, see infra section IV.B. 
55. Nineteenth-century economist Francis Edgeworth proposed the development of a 
“hedonimeter” to measure people’s experiences, but his suggestion was rendered at least 
temporarily obsolete by a paradigm shift in the social sciences. FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, 
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL 
SCIENCES 98–102 (1881). On Edgeworth, see David Colander, Retrospectives: Edgeworth’s 
Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 215, 216–19 (2007). 
56. Although note that considerable strides have been made in measuring well-being. See 
discussion at infra section IV.B.2. 
57. See MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL 
AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 41 (2003) (“For years, medical paternalism—the belief that 
doctors should make decisions for patients— ruled.”). 
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patients without regard to patients’ individual preferences and often 
without patients’ full knowledge or consent.58 Paternalism prioritizes 
patient well-being under the premise that physicians best identify 
welfare-maximizing choices for patients. The language of the 1847 Code 
of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, titled 
“Obligations of Patients to Their Physicians,” illustrates the philosophy 
of the time: 
The obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physician 
should be prompt and implicit. He should never permit his own 
crude opinions as to their fitness, to influence his attention to 
them.59 
It was the era of “doctor knows best.” Patients were treated as being 
simple-minded when it came to medicine. They were taught to trust in 
the expertise of their physicians. Indeed, before the twentieth century, 
there was no requirement that patients even consent to procedures.60 
Doctors were bound by the Hippocratic Oath, requiring that they do no 
harm, and were generally thought to be responsible for making decisions 
to promote their patients’ well-being.61 
Prior to the twentieth century, physicians generally bore no legal 
responsibility for obtaining consent before treating patients.62 Given the 
paternalist bent of the times, this is not surprising. Physicians were 
responsible for making decisions to further the welfare of their patients, 
not to effectuate the decisions of patients who were not experts in the 
practice of medicine. Early twentieth-century cases including Mohr v. 
Williams63 and Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital64 first 
                                                     
58. Paternalism in general refers to constraining autonomous choice without consent for the 
purpose of helping or protecting someone. See Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, 
What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833 (2016) (citing Lindsay J. Thompson, 
Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS & SOCIETY 1 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008)). 
59. See Walter Wadlington, Breaking the Silence of Doctor and Patient, 93 YALE L.J. 1640, 
1643 (1984) (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 1847, at 232). 
60. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (medical consent first recognized as a 
legal requirement in the United States). 
61. Professional Codes of Ethics dominated during this period, as well. The medical profession 
was viewed as one that could self-regulate to promote the good of its patients. See PAUL STARR, 
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
62. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 14 (1986); Valerie Gutmann Koch, A Private Right of Action for Informed Consent in 
Research, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 173, 178 (2015); Jonathan F. Will, A Brief Historical and 
Theoretical Perspective on Patient Autonomy and Medical Decision Making, 139 CHEST 669, 669–
73 (2011). But see P. Dalla-Vorgia et al., Is Consent in Medicine a Concept Only of Modern Times?, 
27 J. MED. ETHICS 59, 59–61 (2001). 
63. 108 N.W. 818, 819 (Minn. 1906) (holding physician liable for failing to obtain consent when 
physician was supposed to operate on right ear but instead operated on left). 
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articulated legal requirements that physicians obtain the consent of their 
patients prior to treatment. But these were battery cases about the need 
to obtain basic consent to a procedure, not about whether the consent 
was adequately informed or who made the treatment choice in the first 
place.65 
2. Commitment to Autonomy Emerged 
Gradually, over the course of the twentieth century, paternalist efforts 
to improve people’s lives fell out of favor across society generally.66 
Specifically, medical paternalism fell out of favor and was replaced by a 
commitment to patient choice.67 
Trust in patient decision-making emerged, in part, due to increasing 
distrust in physician decision-making.68 Particularly in the 1950s and 
1960s, the ascension of this view had quite practical roots. Paternalistic 
physicians were obliged to act in the best interests of their patients. In 
reality, though, physicians have been influenced by a variety of 
incentives that might conflict with the incentive to promote a patient’s 
well-being. For instance, surgeons might recommend a more aggressive 
surgical approach rather than medical treatment, in part, because it will 
increase their personal compensation.69 Or physicians might undertake a 
risky procedure no one else has accomplished, motivated by desire for 
                                                     
64. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (finding liability in battery and recognizing a right to medical self-
determination where physician did surgery on patient during a routine exam without consent). 
65. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that surgery is a technical 
battery unless there is consent by the patient); Nolan v. Kechijian, 64 A.2d 866, 868 (R.I. 
1949) (“[A]n operation without consent . . . constitutes a . . . battery. . . .”); Physicians’ & Dentists’ 
Bus. Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568, 569 (1941) (explaining that an unauthorized 
operation is a battery). 
66. See Sawicki, supra note 30. 
67. See id. (noting that the doctrine of informed consent arose in the mid-twentieth century in 
part in response to dissatisfaction with medical paternalism); AM. HOSP. ASSOC., A PATIENT’S BILL 
OF RIGHTS (1973, rev. 1992); The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115–17, 
1388-204–06 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
68. See Alfred I. Tauber, Sick Autonomy, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 484, 484–85 (2003) 
(noting the unsettling of confidence in government, education, and medicine during the Vietnam 
era). 
69. This problem is still prevalent to this day. Studies have found that the highest-paid 
physicians are those that offer more services per patient, rather than treating more patients. See 
Andrew Soergel, Study: Doctors Paid More for Multiple Procedures Rather than for Multiple 
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professional acclaim. Accordingly, broad support emerged for the view 
that decisions should be left to the people who will be most personally 
affected by them—the patients.70 
A growing trust in individual rationality—along with the theory that if 
we give people good enough information,71 they will rationally choose 
that which will increase their own utility—also bolstered the move from 
paternalism to autonomy.72 According to the rational choice model of 
human decision-making, letting people choose for themselves was the 
best way for them to improve their well-being.73 This approach, 
dominant in law and economics scholarship of the past half century, 
significantly influenced many areas of the law.74 
Trust in individual decision-making also grew with the rise of 
American consumerism. Following the Great Depression and World 
War II, Americans saw their spending power increase and the 
marketplace for goods proliferate.75 Choice became much more central 
to the American existence than it had been before. And the health care 
story mirrored that of society more generally. Advances in medical 
technology provided more treatment options and more choice.76 And 
patients began to see themselves as having a right to become educated 
about and make their own medical decisions.77 Importantly, the 
proliferation in medical treatment options highlighted the possibility of 
                                                     
70. See Sawicki, supra note 30. 
71. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE 
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 5 (2014) (“Mandated disclosure is alluring because it 
resonates with two fundamental American ideologies. The first is the free market principle. Markets 
work best when buyers are informed; disclosures inform them.”). 
72. Wells, supra note 35, at 165–69.  
73. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790, 803 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
74. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 71, at 50 (citing Proprietary Vocational & 
Home Study Schs., 43 Fed. Reg. 60,796, 60,805 (Dec. 28, 1978)) (suggesting the prevalence in U.S. 
law of a more information is better mantra along these lines) (“It is a basic tenet of our economic 
system that information in the hands of consumers facilitates rational purchase decisions; and, 
moreover, is an absolute necessity for efficient functioning of the economy.”). 
75. Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 236, 236–37 (2004). 
76. See EDWARD P. RICHARD & KATHARINE C. RATHBUN, MEDICAL CARE LAW 235 (1999) 
(“After World War II, the U.S. Government began to subsidize and otherwise encourage the 
construction of hospitals and the training of physicians. Technology became more important in 
medical practice . . . . This trend continued through the 1950s, with technology-based medicine 
becoming the norm in the 1960s.”). 
77. See HELENA LEINO-KILPI ET AL., PATIENT’S AUTONOMY, PRIVACY AND INFORMED 
CONSENT 55 (2000) (citation omitted) (“The modern medical era which started after World War II, 
might be called the Age of Autonomy.”).  
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heterogeneity in patients’ individual preferences.78 In this sense, health 
care decisions became more like car shopping.79 Accordingly, letting 
people make decisions consistent with their preferences seemed to make 
the most sense, particularly because no outside third-party could 
effectively predict what those preferences might be in any given 
scenario. Relatedly, a perceived impossibility at structuring a system 
around patient well-being left patient choice as the only plausible 
option.80 
3. Autonomy Value Became Entrenched in Informed Consent 
Doctrine 
Against this backdrop, the second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed the emergence and subsequent entrenchment of the law’s 
commitment to autonomy in the development of the doctrine of 
informed consent. 
The law moved from a battery approach to a negligence approach and 
came to hold that mere consent was no longer enough. In Canterbury v. 
Spence,81 the court held that physicians have a duty to provide certain 
information to patients in securing their consent to procedures.82 There, a 
physician did not disclose the risks of a back surgery to a patient prior to 
obtaining the patient’s consent to the surgery.83 Following the surgery, 
the patient fell and suffered near complete paralysis. The court discussed 
the physician’s “duty of risk disclosure” and held that the standard of 
disclosure should be determined by law and not by the medical 
profession itself.84 
                                                     
78. So-called “preference-sensitive care” emerged, which offered treatment alternatives for 
which there was no universally agreed-upon medical choice. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN 
THE UNITED STATES (James R. Knickman & Anthony R. Kovner eds., 11th ed. 2015) (“[F]or 
preference-sensitive care there is evidence for providing alternative clinical interventions for the 
same condition. This is apparent in the case of chronic stable angina (medical treatment versus 
angioplasty versus bypass surgery), back pain due to herniated disc or spinal stenosis (medical 
treatment versus back surgery), and early stage prostate cancer (watchful waiting versus radiation 
versus radical prostatectomy).”); see also supra note 27. 
79. See generally Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, 
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008). 
80. However, we now have useful if not perfect methods to help predict patient well-being. See 
infra section IV.B. 
81. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
82. See Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 596 
(2006) (“Informed consent, then, is designed to protect patients by ensuring that they have the 
material information with which to make an informed choice.”). 
83. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786–87. 
84. Id. at 781, 784–85. 
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Today, there are two different views of the duty to disclose that a 
physician owes a patient. About half the states subscribe to the 
physician-based standard, which requires the physician to inform a 
patient of the risks, benefits, and alternatives that a “reasonably prudent” 
doctor practicing in the field would.85 In the other half of the states, the 
focus is on what the patient would want to know before making the 
decision—a reasonable patient standard.86 The reasonable patient 
standard generally means a higher bar for physicians to meet, but the 
physician’s duty under either standard is to disclose. And the parameters 
of that duty are defined by reference to professional custom or a 
reasonable, objective patient.87 
The informed consent duty, in general, means that a doctor must 
explain the available treatment options and the attendant risks and 
benefits to the patient.88 In practical terms, a doctor will typically present 
treatment or procedure options and describe the risks and benefits of 
those treatments or of choosing to do nothing at all. Failure to do this 
properly—that is, the process of informing the patient in order to then 
obtain “informed” consent—will result in liability (assuming the patient 
sues).89 But after being provided the required information, the patient 
makes the decision, consistent with the preeminence that has come to be 
attached to the autonomy value.90 
                                                     
85. King & Moulton, supra note 30, at 440. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 438, 443 (“While this standard makes large strides in the name of patient autonomy, it 
assumes that all patients value risks and benefits similarly. As a result, it is based on the needs of an 
objective or reasonable patient, rather than the subjective patient who will actually undergo the 
procedure.”). 
88. See Sheley, supra note 29, at 68–77 (surveying informed consent law). 
89. Id. at 76. 
90. As long as the patient is competent to make the decision, the physician bears no 
responsibility for what decision is made. See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in 
Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 
424 (1990) (noting general deference to patient after disclosure of risks). Indeed, even if the 
physician were to want to override a poor decision, the law provides no opening for the physician to 
do so. See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO 
TREATMENT (1998) (discussing requirement of competency to make medical decisions). The law 
also does not provide for the scenario where a patient does not want to decide and wants to defer to 
the physician. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE (2015). 
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4. Rationale for Autonomy-Centric Informed Consent Doctrine 
Scholars and lawmakers justify current doctrine on two bases. First, 
much of the commitment to informed consent relates to the deontic right 
to self-determination.91 As Marjorie Maguire Shultz notes: 
[T]he more intense and personal the consequences of a choice 
and the less direct or significant the impact of that choice upon 
others, the more compelling the claim to autonomy in the 
making of a given decision. Under this criterion, the case for 
respecting patient autonomy in decisions about health and bodily 
fate is very strong.92 
But informed consent doctrine is also strongly promoted as the best 
proxy for patient well-being.93 However, here, well-being means 
something different than Bentham’s view of well-being or welfare as 
happiness. Rather, this argument is that people have more “welfare” to 
the extent that they get more of what they want—that is, to the extent 
that they are more able to satisfy their preferences.94 Daniel Kahneman 
refers to this account of welfare as “decision utility” in contrast to 
Bentham’s “experienced utility,” because the former uses people’s 
choices as the best measure of what is good for them.95 
To adopt this conception of well-being, one has to make certain 
important assumptions about people’s behavior. First, people must have 
or be capable of forming stable, reasonably well-defined preferences. 
They must actually prefer state A over state B, presumably for the reason 
                                                     
91. Carl Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 417–18 (2006). 
92. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected 
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1985) (arguing that patient preferences generally ought to be 
controlling); see also King & Moulton, supra note 30, at 435 (“Self-determination is the subset of 
autonomy most commonly associated with informed consent and health care, such that decisions 
originate freely from an autonomous agent, who understands the facts and can engage in practical 
reasoning to come to a decision.”). 
93. See MATTHEW ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 50–51 (2012) (describing conceptions of well-being); LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON 
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 86, 89 (1932). 
94. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE ELUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF WELL-BEING 34 (2008) (“The dominant account among economists and philosophers over the 
last century or so . . . identifies well-being with the satisfaction of the individual’s desires.”). Of 
course it is possible that the act of choosing itself is welfare-enhancing, in which case the line 
between welfare and autonomy may blur. A patient might experience more relative happiness, at 
least in the short-term, in the act of making the decision even if it does not result in the best possible 
outcome later. 
95. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 375, 375–77 (1997). 
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that state A will be better for them than state B.96 Accordingly, people 
must be capable of making judgments about what will be better for them 
and about how the attributes of the alternatives will affect them. Finally, 
people must be able to make rational choices related to these judgments 
that are not systematically influenced by irrelevant factors.97 This does 
not mean that people have to be perfect choosers—only that the errors 
they make should be randomly rather than systematically distributed 
around whatever the “correct” answer is. If these assumptions are 
correct, then individuals’ autonomous choices offer the best proxy for 
their well-being.98 
Indeed, the belief in autonomy as begetting well-being is prevalent in 
the literature.99 Medical scholars and legal scholars have both fervently 
argued that promoting decisional autonomy actually leads to better 
patient outcomes. Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp illustrate: 
Standing behind the position that authority should rest with the 
patients or subjects may be the goal of benefiting patients and 
subjects by enabling them to make the decision that best 
promotes their own welfare. Promotion of the value of 
autonomous choice in medical decisionmaking by patients is 
often justified by arguments from beneficence to the effect that 
decisional autonomy by patients enables them to survive, heal, 
or otherwise improve their own health.100 
In 1982, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine opined that patient autonomy in medical decision-
making promotes “patient well-being” and “therapeutic gains.”101 Others 
have argued that the exercise of autonomy allows patients “to protect 
                                                     
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. According to some strands of philosophy, preference satisfaction is not simply a proxy for 
welfare but actually constitutes welfare. See ADLER, supra note 93 at 50. 
99. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 71, at 39. 
100.  RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 14 (1986); see also PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 
18–23 (1982) (patient autonomy in medical decision-making promotes “patient well-being” and 
“therapeutic gains”); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 46, at 681 (mandated disclosure rules like 
informed consent serve the autonomy principle by “suppos[ing] that people make better decisions 
for themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making 
decisions”). 
101.  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 100, at 18–23. 
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their well-being as they themselves define it,”102 and that “[s]o long as 
an individual decides in light of adequate information, and chooses 
freely, she will act to promote her subjective well-being . . . .”103 
According to Nadia Sawicki, there is widespread belief in the medical 
field that “allowing patients to make autonomous choices ultimately 
promotes their welfare by leading to objectively better choices.”104 That 
the autonomy model might permit patients to experience “other benefits, 
such as greater feelings of competence and control,” is also frequently 
mentioned in support of the model.105 Accordingly, most policymakers 
agree that allowing patients to direct their treatment promotes both of the 
law’s two most important goals for regulating health care. 
If patients, presented with good information, could be trusted to 
accurately select among the treatment options that are made available to 
them, then current doctrine would indeed seem to answer both deontic 
concerns about patient autonomy and instrumental concerns about 
patient well-being. But as Part II illustrates, there is significant reason to 
doubt that patient choice often results in maximizing patient well-being. 
II. PATIENTS OFTEN MAKE BAD DECISIONS 
The law’s belief that autonomy and informed consent will generate 
patient well-being arises from its assumption that patients have stable 
preferences and that patients are generally good at taking those 
preferences and making health treatment decisions that will make their 
lives better off. There is a mountain of evidence showing that these 
assumptions are fundamentally flawed. Patients both lack stable 
preferences and succumb to a series of decision-making biases that 
systematically undermine their ability to choose what is best for them. 
Poor decision-making has dire consequences not just for the individuals 
making the decisions but also for the health care system more generally, 
which often bears the cost of bad decisions.106 
                                                     
102.  Robert M. Arnold et al., Opioid Contracts in Chronic Nonmalignant Pain Management: 
Objectives and Uncertainties, 119 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 292, 293 (citing JESSICA W. BERG ET 
AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2001)). 
103.  Daniel P. Sulmasy, Informed Consent Without Autonomy, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 207, 209 
(2002). 
104.  Sawicki, supra note 30, at 827; see also Isaac Buck, Overtreatment and Informed Consent, 
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901, 917 (2016) (“Beyond satisfying the bioethical tenet of autonomy and 
the law’s concern with bodily integrity, it may simply be the case that patients just make better 
decisions as they are free from notable pressures.”). 
105.  See Schuck, supra note 29, at 943. 
106. For evidence that bad decision-making negatively impacts the cost of health care in the 
United States, see infra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
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A. Many Patients Do Not Have Stable Preferences About Care 
Much of the law’s commitment to autonomy as a mechanism for 
maximizing patient welfare relies on the notion that patients have 
heterogeneous yet stable preferences about options and treatments.107 
Just as an individual might reliably prefer coffee rather than tea, people 
are thought to have stable preferences as to health care. Some may be 
more cost sensitive, while others may care more about pain or longevity. 
Allowing patients to actualize their preferences through choice means 
they can express these differences.108 However, the behavioral sciences 
literature casts this story into deep doubt.109 
Across many decision-making fields, people’s preferences are not 
stable and well-defined. Their preferences are constructed by the nature 
of the decision-making task, and they change relative to irrelevant 
information.110 While people may have stable preferences for things that 
they consume regularly,111 they do not have stable preferences for wait-
and-see versus spinal fusion surgery. The fundamental belief of the 
orthodox informed consent literature—that patients have beliefs and 
preferences that doctors can tap into and comply with—is deeply flawed 
in the context of most meaningful medical decisions. Many patients do 
not have preferences at all about these decisions and prefer for others to 
decide for them.112 And even if a given patient is more cost-sensitive 
than most, the complexity of medical decision-making requires much 
more knowledge about her preferences than that. How much more 
sensitive is she? How is she willing to trade off cost versus pain or 
quality of life? Most patients have never developed preferences about 
                                                     
107. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Arthur S. Elstein, Cognitive Processes and Biases in 
Medical Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE: THEORY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND 
APPLICATIONS 183 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. Sonnenberg eds., 2000). 
108. This is a prevalent argument in the literature supporting the autonomy value. See, e.g., 
supra notes 44–45. 
109. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364, 367 (1995). 
110. See generally GIUSEPPE CARENINI & DAVID POOLE, CONSTRUCTED PREFERENCES AND 
VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR AI RESEARCH ON PREFERENCE ELICITATION 
(2002). 
111. Dan Ariely’s work even casts doubt on whether people have stable preferences for these 
sorts of quotidian choices. Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Tom Sawyer and the 
Construction of Value, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (2006) (showing that in some cases, people do 
not even have a pre-existing sense of whether an experience is good or bad and that they can be 
manipulated into choosing different options). 
112. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 90 (discussing evidence that patients often do not want to make 
medical decisions). 
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these trade-offs, and now, once they are sick, they are being asked to do 
so on the spot. 
Moreover, even to the extent that they may have some general 
preferences about treatment, there is every reason to believe that the core 
of stability may be easily overwhelmed by the effects of decision 
frames113 and judgment heuristics.114 According to Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s influential account of decision-making, which they 
call “prospect theory,” people evaluate options not in the abstract but 
with regard to available reference points.115 People are differentially 
sensitive to different sorts of reference points. For example, Kahneman 
and Tversky have shown that people are much more concerned about 
loss of a given magnitude than they are by an equivalent gain.116 Yet 
whether the amount is viewed as a loss or as a gain is a matter of how 
the decision is framed. In a famous study,117 Tversky and Kahneman 
gave half of their subjects the following question: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of 
the programs is as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72 
percent] 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will 
be saved. [28 percent] 
Which of the two programs would you favor?118 
The other half of the subjects received the same statement but two 
different descriptions of the treatment choices: 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. [22 percent] 
                                                     
113. A decision frame describes the fact that choosers make different choices depending on the 
way in which the choice is presented. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing 
of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981). 
114. A judgment heuristic describes a rule or simplification mechanism that a chooser may 
employ in making a decision, such as focusing on one aspect of a problem and ignoring other 
information. Heuristics can be useful but can also lead to systematic errors in decision-making. Id. 
115. Tyersky and Kahneman, supra note 113, at 454; see also Jacob Goldin, Which Way to 
Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 237–38 (2015) 
(describing framing effects and noting that “a key insight from behavioral economics is that . . . 
seemingly arbitrary features of the decision may also affect which option people choose”); Yuval 
Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, (A, f): Choices with Frames, 75 REV. ECON. STUD. 1287 (2008). 
116. Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 113, at 453. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will 
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. [78 percent] 
Which of the two programs would you favor?119 
Notice that the choices between the two options are identical in both 
conditions except for the way in which the outcomes are framed. 
Program A is identical to Program C, and the same is true for Programs 
B and D. Yet, subjects given the first frame (the choice between A or B) 
overwhelming chose Program A (72%), while those given the second 
frame (the choice between C and D) chose Program D by an equally 
large margin (78%).120 In the first frame, people were attracted to the 
“sure thing” in Program A, which seemed to guarantee a certain number 
of lives saved. Subjects were not inclined to take the risk of killing more 
people. Yet in the second frame, subjects evaluated the Program D in 
light of the certainty of killing 400 people. Given this “loss frame,” 
people were risk-seeking about the possibility of saving all of the lives. 
Similarly, Cass Sunstein gives the example of a patient deciding 
whether or not to have an operation. If the patient is told that of 100 
people who have the surgery, ninety are alive after five years, they are 
far more likely to agree to the surgery than if the patient is told that ten 
are dead.121 
Frames do not affect which choice is the most welfare-enhancing for 
the individual. Rather, they induce an individual to make a choice for 
reasons unrelated to the individual’s well-being.122 In general, patients’ 
preferences are highly likely to be constructed with reference to the 
decision-making frame. The rational, stable decision-maker of the 
informed consent literature is a chimera. 
B. Patients Often Do Not Maximize Well-Being: Affective Forecasting 
Errors and Other Biases 
Important social scientific findings in the last half-century of research 
have also demonstrated that human decision-making is beset by a host of 
heuristics and biases that systematically undermine rational choice.123 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 29 
(2014). 
122. See Goldin, supra note 115, at 238; Christopher K. Hsee et al., Hedonomics: Bridging 
Decision Research with Happiness Research, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 231–37 (2008). See 
generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
123. See Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning From Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision-
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Scholars in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and a host of other 
fields have catalogued the many ways in which people deviate from 
rational appraisals of risk and probability. 
Expected utility theory—the dominant normative account of human 
decision-making—suggests that when people confront judgments, they 
should act according to the costs and benefits of the different options, 
taking into account the probability of each outcome.124 In the case of a 
patient choosing between two treatment options for a disease, the theory 
holds that the patient should compare the potential benefits of the two 
options, as well as the probable risks associated with each one, and 
select the option in which the ratio of benefits to costs is highest.125 
However, emerging research suggests people’s decisions are in fact 
influenced by irrelevant information that often causes serious mistakes 
in judgment.126 Patients weighing risky medical procedures are 
especially likely to suffer from these sorts of biases.127 Obviously, 
weighing costs and benefits and estimating probabilities are difficult 
tasks, so we should not expect people to be perfect at this task. We 
should expect, however, that in the long run, or across a large enough 
population, random errors will balance out. What the decision-making 
research shows, though, is that people often make systematic errors in 
these tasks. As a result, people do not always pick what will make them 
happiest.128 
1. Affective Forecasting Errors 
For instance, one category of errors people often make when they 
contemplate the hedonic consequences of a great variety of situations or 
life events are affective forecasting errors—which lead to systematic 
                                                     
Making, in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISITICS AND BIASES 268 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982). 
124. See Brian J. Cohen, Is Expected Utility Theory Normative for Medical Decision-Making?, 
16 MED. DECISION MAKING 1, 1–6 (1996). See generally Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The 
Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility, 60 J. POL. ECON. 463 (1952). 
125. See M.G. MYRIAM HUNINK ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE: 
INTEGRATING EVIDENCE AND VALUES 53 (2d ed. 2014). 
126. George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 
1209, 1238 (2003). 
127. Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional 
Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 72–76 (1993). 
128. Neal V. Dawson & Hal R. Arkes, Systematic Errors in Medical Decision Making, 2 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 183, 183 (1987); David E. Kanouse, Explaining Negativity Biases in Evaluation 
and Choice Behavior: Theory and Research, 11 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 703, 706 (1984). 
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mispredictions about how situations would make people feel.129 It is not 
just that people estimating the effects of an illness, for example, make 
random errors about how suffering from the illness will make them feel. 
Rather, they tend to make errors that skew strongly in one direction or 
another.130 
For example, people systematically overestimate both the magnitude 
and duration of the hedonic impacts of many negative life events 
including being denied tenure, being broken up with, and having one’s 
favored sports team lose.131 And, importantly for present purposes, 
people tend to mispredict the effects of a variety of health-related 
conditions, including losing a limb, becoming a paraplegic, or utilizing a 
colostomy.132 In each of these cases and more, healthy people tend to 
think that experiencing those conditions will make them substantially 
less happy than it actually does and that they will suffer for a longer 
period than they actually do.133 
In study after study, healthy people predict that those suffering from 
diseases and disabilities feel much worse than those people actually 
report feeling.134 For example, healthy people estimate that living with 
chronic dialysis results in a quality of life of 0.39 on a scale of 0 (as bad 
as death) to 1 (perfect health), while dialysis patients report their quality 
of life as 0.56. Similarly, although patients with colostomies report their 
                                                     
129. See Peter Ayton et al., Affective Forecasting: Why Can’t People Predict Their Emotions?, 
13 THINKING & REASONING 62, 68–70, 75–79 (2007); Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective 
Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERN 
MED. 1708, 1708 (2008). 
130. Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by 
Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005). 
131. See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based 
Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 187, 199 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. 
Carrillo eds., 2003). 
132. See Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 58, 63 (1990); C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and 
Emotional Status, 16 SPINE 78, 80 (1991); Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and 
Adolescents with Limb Deficiencies: A Review, 12 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 275, 276–77 (1992). 
133. See Boyd, supra note 132, at 63; Lundqvist, supra note 132, at 80; Tyc, supra note 132, at 
276–77. 
134. See, e.g., Ubel et al., supra note 130, at 111 (“One of the most commonly replicated 
‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of people with health 
conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their quality of life would be if they had those 
conditions . . . .”); Peter A. Ubel, Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and 
Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57, S57 (2005) (“Across a wide range of 
health conditions, patients typically report greater happiness and [quality of life] than do healthy 
people under similar circumstances.”). 
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quality of life as 0.92 on the same scale, healthy people estimate that 
living with a colostomy would yield only 0.80 quality of life.135 
Dan Gilbert and Tim Wilson suggest that affective forecasting errors 
are often caused by what they refer to as focalism.136 When people 
contemplate what it would be like to become paraplegic, for example, 
they focus on all of the aspects of their lives that would change. In so 
doing, however, they ignore the typically larger aspects of their lives that 
remain the same.137 The pleasures associated with reading a book, 
having a conversation, or drinking a glass of wine may not dissipate and 
may even increase.138 Moreover, when people are asked what it would 
be like to be paraplegic, they tend to focus on what it would be like to 
become paraplegic. This overemphasizes the tragic moments of learning 
about the disability relative to the much longer period of having the 
disability.139 
Affective forecasting errors also arise because people neglect how 
rapidly they will recover emotionally from injuries and disabilities.140 
Since the 1970s, social scientists have been collecting overwhelming 
evidence of people’s ability to hedonically adapt to many life events. 
Although the onset of many events, including many negative health 
states, is initially accompanied by deep unhappiness, people’s 
psychological immune systems soon kick in, muting the intensity and 
duration of their suffering.141 Within a few years, many people who have 
experienced significant disabilities regain much of their pre-injury well-
being.142 
But just as people often overestimate the magnitude and duration of 
the negative experience associated with some disabilities, they may 
systematically underestimate the negativity associated with other 
                                                     
135. Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with 
Chronic Health Conditions Because of a Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 190 
(2001). The studies reported here also show the difficulty of debiasing healthy people with these 
focusing illusions. 
136. Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want, 14 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005). 
137. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 SCI. 
1351, 1353 (2007). 
138. Peter A. Ubel et al., supra note 130, at 111. 
139. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A 
Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 344–45 (1998). 
140. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 634–35 (1998). 
141. Ubel et al., supra note 130, at 111. 
142. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and 
the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1529 (2008). 
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disabilities.143 Some health problems, like chronic pain, migraine 
headaches, or ringing in the ears may prove resistant to adaptation 
because they do not easily fade into the background.144 These issues may 
create long-lasting diminutions in well-being, but, because they seem 
relatively benign compared to losing a limb, people may underestimate 
how bad they will be.145 
2. Other Heuristics and Biases 
A host of other biases and heuristics also means that patients will 
make treatment choices that will not necessarily maximize their 
welfare.146 One well-documented problem concerns the availability 
heuristic, in which people estimate the probability of an event occurring 
based on the ease with which they can recall examples of it.147 For 
example, people overestimate the ratio of deaths caused by airplane 
crashes to deaths caused by car accidents because the former are so vivid 
in people’s memories.148 Availability may substantially influence patient 
decision-making, as well, since some diseases and risks—cancer, heart 
                                                     
143. Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses 1–39 (U. Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working 
Paper No. 164, 2007). 
144. Id. According to Dolan and Kahneman: 
Whilst adaptation to changed health appears widespread, it is certainly not universal. There is, 
for instance, evidence of increased sensitisation to pain . . . . Moreover, there is also evidence 
that coping with repeated episodes of pain leaves patients more vulnerable to stressful 
events . . . . There is some evidence that people do not adapt to progressive diseases . . . in 
degenerative disorders and . . . in multiple sclerosis. 
Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for the Valuation 
of Health, 118 ECON. J. 215, 218 (citations omitted). 
145. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302, 302–29 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
146. There are too many relevant heuristics and biases to adequately discuss here. I offer the 
examples in the text to give a sense of the problem but direct readers to the following sources for a 
fuller discussion of the relevant cognitive biases: Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and 
the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984); Pat Croskerry et. al, Cognitive 
Debiasing 1: Origins of Bias and Theory of Debiasing, BMJ QUALITY AND SAFETY 1–7 (2013); 
Jason Ross Penzer, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and 
the Law of Information Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health Care Reform, 12 YALE J. ON 
REG. 207, 242–43 (1995) (discussing cognitive biases relevant to consumer choice in the health 
care market); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American 
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1731 (1999); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). 
147. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973). 
148. Id. 
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disease, and various newsworthy epidemics such as Ebola or Zika 
virus—are substantially easier for many people to recall than others.149 
Another important set of biases involves how people respond to 
acting compared to non-acting. A wealth of research has suggested that 
when it comes to medical risks, healthy people often suffer from a 
substantial omission bias.150 Thus, when comparing two choices, one of 
which involves acting and causing a certain amount of harm and the 
other involves doing nothing and causing more harm, people often 
choose to do nothing even though it is the riskier option.151 For example, 
many people choose not to take a flu vaccine to prevent an illness if it 
has a one percent chance of death although the risks of non-vaccination 
are substantially higher.152 Dying from the vaccine and dying from the 
flu both result in death, so all else equal, people should choose the 
outcome with the lower probability of death.153 Nonetheless, many 
people do not want to feel responsible for choosing an action that may 
make them sick.154 
Interestingly, when the decision-making frame is flipped, from 
currently healthy to currently sick, people seem to exhibit an alternative 
commission bias.155 Imagine that you’ve been diagnosed with cancer that 
has a five percent chance of killing you in the next five years. Your 
physician presents you with two options: Wait and See, which has a five 
percent chance of death, or Surgery, which has a ten percent chance of 
death. According to expected utility theory, Wait and See is clearly the 
better option. But according to studies by Angela Fagerlin and 
                                                     
149. This is not merely computational. Ellen Peters et al., A Heuristics Approach to 
Understanding Cancer Risk Perception: Contributions from Judgment and Decision-Making 
Research, 31 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 45, 47–48 (2006). 
150. Jennifer Amsterlaw et al., Can Avoidance of Complications Lead to Biased Healthcare 
Decisions?, 1 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 64, 73 (2006); Mark Spranca et al., Omission and 
Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 84–93 (1991). 
151. Arthur S. Elstein et al., Comparison of Physicians’ Decisions Regarding Estrogen 
Replacement Therapy for Menopausal Women and Decisions Derived from a Decision Analytic 
Model, 80 AM. J. MED. 246, 253–54 (1986). 
152. David A. Asch et al., Omission Bias and Pertussis Vaccination, 14 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 118, 118–23 (1994). 
153. This is not to suggest that these deaths are necessarily the same in terms of their effects on 
peoples’ quality of life while they are sick. In the cited experiments, however, the risk of death from 
non-vaccination was substantially higher than from vaccination to account for any difference in 
dying more painfully from vaccination. 
154. Id. at 120. 
155. Pat Croskerry, The Importance of Cognitive Errors in Diagnosis and Strategies to Minimize 
Them, 78 ACAD. MED. 775, 778 (2003). 
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colleagues, most people would choose Surgery.156 The tumor diagnosis, 
they suggest, has become a “call to action,” even though action is not 
often not warranted.157 The authors note, “people’s treatment decisions 
may be based not on the effectiveness of the treatments but rather on 
their beliefs about how cancer should be treated.”158 The perception that 
cancer is an invasion that needs to be stopped significantly influences 
treatment choice in ways that are not necessarily rational. 
The commission bias observed in these studies is likely a cause for 
the overtreatment and mistreatment of a number of diseases in the 
United States. Different prostate cancer treatments have very similar 
survival rates, but a significant proportion of men choose radical 
prostatectomy over watchful waiting even though the former has much 
greater side effects.159 The same is likely true for breast cancer and 
radical mastectomy and the overreliance on coronary stents for patients 
with stable coronary artery disease.160 According to the American 
Medical Association and the Joint Commission, as many as ten percent 
of elective stent placements may be inappropriate and another third 
medically questionable.161 That patients choose these procedures even 
when given complete information about the risks involved makes sense, 
however, in light of commission bias. Doing something feels better to 
many patients than doing nothing. 
The above examples suggest the manifold ways in which patient 
decision-making can be systematically biased away from rational 
choices about their treatment. To this already long list could be added 
another series of challenges arising from the difficulties that many 
people face when dealing with numbers and probabilities. Many scholars 
have expressed concern about “innumeracy” among patients—
effectively, being unable to understand numerical relationships in the 
                                                     
156. Angela Fagerlin et al., Cure Me Even if It Kills Me: Preferences for Invasive Cancer 
Treatment, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 614, 616–19 (2005). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 618 (emphasis in original). 
159. Id.  
160. Bernard Fisher et al., Reanalysis and Results After 12 Years of Follow-Up in a Randomized 
Clinical Trial Comparing Total Mastectomy With Lumpectomy With or Without Irradiation in the 
Treatment of Breast Cancer, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1456, 1457–61 (1995); Lindi H. VanderWalde 
& Stephen B. Edge, Decisions Shared or Otherwise: The Ongoing Evolution of Local Therapy for 
Breast Cancer, 32 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 873, 873–74 (2014); Anahad O’Connor, Heart Stents 
Still Overused, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15., 2013), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/ heart-stents-continue-to-be-overused/?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/3H7P-EYJS].  
161. Fisher, supra note 160, at 1457–61; VanderWalde, supra note 160, at 873–74; O’Connor, 
supra note 160. 
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ways that illiterate people cannot understand written ones.162 This is 
particularly troubling in the medical context because the value of 
different treatment options often comes down to variations in numerical 
probabilities.163 If people do not appreciate the difference between a 1 
percent risk and a 0.1 percent risk, they may end up making terrible 
choices about their treatment.164 
The health care context is particularly ripe for decisional errors for 
these reasons, but also for the more general ones that decisions can be 
very complex and novel in the sense that they often do not involve issues 
that individuals have had to grapple with before,165 and implicate often 
competing values in ways that simple decisions like apples versus 
oranges do not. 
Indeed, there is strong evidence that patients are frequently choosing 
badly under the current regime.166 They choose to have a stent surgically 
placed rather than making lifestyle changes.167 They choose to have 
spinal fusion surgeries when intensive physical therapy would be 
better.168 They get radiation for early stage prostate cancer when it does 
not benefit survival and could have debilitating side effects.169 The 
general epidemic of overtreatment in the United States suggests that 
patients are consenting to tests and procedures that they should not be—
that either have no benefit or are “outright harmful.”170 A recent study of 
                                                     
162. Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy Skill and the Communication, Comprehension, and Use of 
Risk-Benefit Information, 26 HEALTH AFF. 741, 741–48 (2007). 
163. Id.  
164. There is ample (and ongoing) research about why individuals are so bad at addressing 
probabilities and uncertainty. See, e.g., LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW 
RANDOMNESS RULES OUR LIVES 5 (2008) (noting how “[t]he mechanisms by which people analyze 
situations involving chance are an intricate product of evolutionary factors, brain structure, personal 
experience, knowledge, and emotion”). 
165. The exception is patients dealing with chronic conditions. 
166. Undoubtedly, physicians also suffer from decision-making biases that ultimately impact 
patient decision-making. The proposed solutions set forth in section III.D therefore suggest data-
driven decisions not left solely to the discretion of any individual subject to cognitive biases. 
167. See, e.g., Lin & Dudley, supra note 26, at 1621–22 (discussing the overuse of stents given 
that they have not been shown to be effective in preventing cardiovascular events for patients with 
stable angina). 
168. See Chou et al., supra note 24, 1069–72 (studies show no difference in outcome between 
spinal fusion and intense rehabilitation); Martin et al., supra note 24, at 661. Despite no difference 
in outcome, spinal fusion surgery means a lengthy and painful recovery. 
169. See, e.g., Timothy J. Daskivich et al., Variation in Treatment Associated with Life 
Expectancy in a Population-Based Cohort of Men with Early-Stage Prostate Cancer, 120 CANCER 
3642 (2014). 
170. See Atul Gawande, Overkill, an Avalanche of Unnecessary Medical Care Is Harming 
Patients Physically and Financially. What Can We Do About It?, NEW YORKER  
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Medicare claims data found that in a single year, a whopping forty-two 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries had received care known to provide 
minimal clinical benefit.171 According to the Institute of Medicine, 
overtreatment is costing the United States at least $210 billion per 
year.172 
Bad patient choice is not a problem just for the patient, but it also 
affects the entire health care system. When patients choose costly but 
ineffective treatments, and insurance companies pay for them,173 
premiums go up for all insureds (or in the case of government programs, 
for all beneficiaries). As premiums increase, poorer individuals are 
priced out of the insurance market. Notably, quality does not improve 
with these rising costs associated with ineffective procedures. The result 
is simply higher health care costs for all. 
In sum, there is ample reason to doubt that patient choice is 
equivalent to patient well-being.174 This is not to suggest that patients are 
uniformly terrible at rational decision-making. They are not. And there 
are ways to assist patients in overcoming these biases. In fact, enormous 
efforts have been made by researchers on judgment and decision-making 
to develop mechanisms to debias patient decision-making or to explain 
complex probabilities to them.175 Nonetheless, it is important to stress 
the enormous challenge associated with relying on patient autonomy to 
accurately gauge well-being. 
                                                     
(May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande 
[http://perma.cc/QC23-4CKV]; Tara Parker-Pope, Overtreatment Is Taking a Harmful Toll, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/overtreatment-is-taking-a-
harmful-toll/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X5QN-8PGE]. 
171. Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 1067, 1067 (2014). 
172. See Annie Lowrey, Study of U.S. Health Care System Finds Both Waste and Opportunity to 
Improve, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/health/policy/waste-
and-promise-seen-in-us-health-care-system.html [https://perma.cc/2HJ7-3C2U]; Eric Felten, Age of 
Incentives: Paying Big Bucks for Puny Results, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2010) https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748704009804575308710787390320 [https://perma.cc/RK65-V4MN]. 
173. Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(on file with author). 
174. Alexander Capron & Donna Spruijt-Metz, Behavioral Economics in the Physician-Patient 
Relationship: A Possible Role for Mobile Devices and Small Data, in NUDGING HEALTH 233, 234 (I. 
Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, and Christopher T. Robertson eds., 2016) (noting that patient 
choice is an unwise doctrinal choice where patients lack stable preferences and cognitive 
dysfunctions prevent them from “accurately perceiving their true interests and objectives”). 
175. Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 422, 422–44 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 199–241 (2006). 
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C. Why Current Doctrine Is Flawed 
Informed consent doctrine may further a patient’s right to self-
determination. Patient choice does permit patients to make the decisions 
that control their own lives. Even so, it is imperfect. If decision frames 
impact a patient’s choice, then patients are not making truly autonomous 
decisions in the sense of effectuating their own preferences. Because 
some framing is inevitable, it is hard to argue that simply delegating 
decisions to patients truly means that patients are engaging in pure self-
determination absent outside interference. 
But more problematic is that patient choice is not a good proxy for 
patient well-being. With any given medical choice, patients may have a 
stable, well-defined preference for a particular treatment choice (or 
outcome). But more often than not, patients are likely to have either no 
preference at all, or to have a preference that was constructed by the 
frame in which the option or outcome was presented. Also, patients may 
have a preference for the treatment option that will increase their well-
being, or they may not. Due to heuristics and biases (and sometimes 
conflicts between outcomes data and well-being data), patients often do 
not have a preference for the treatment that will most positively impact 
their lives. The following graph illustrates some possibilities: 
 
Figure 1: Patient Decision-Making Possibilities 
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In the upper right-hand quadrant, the patient prefers treatment A and 
treatment A is also the choice that will make the patient the best off. 
Particularly at the point marked “1,” current law is not problematic. The 
same applies equally to the lower left-hand quadrant. If we let the patient 
choose, the patient will choose that which is actually the best option. 
That is how informed consent law was designed to work. 
But in the upper left-hand quadrant, the patient prefers an option that 
is not the better option for the patient. This problem is particularly acute 
at the point marked “2,” where the patient strongly prefers an option that 
is very much not the welfare-maximizing choice.176 For example, a 
patient might be deeply opposed to amputation of a limb, and yet such a 
choice may be the one to most increase the patient’s well-being. Many 
amputees report substantial hedonic adaptation and are no less happy 
than they were before.177 Attempting to save a damaged limb could, 
however, produce enormous long-term pain and crushing medical 
bills.178 Or the patient may prefer the spinal fusion surgery because of a 
commission bias (perhaps a bias that is shared by the physician), but a 
physical therapy regime is much more likely to increase the patient’s 
well-being. 
In the face of this conflict—between one choice that is highly likely 
to maximize well-being and a patient’s strong preference for the choice 
that will not—it is problematic that current law simply accepts the 
patient’s choice without considering the implications—for patients and 
for society—of doing so. What we know about patient decision-making 
suggests that significant numbers of patients may be at or around point 
“2.” 
Also problematic are points “3” and “4” on the graph, where the 
patient has no stable, well-defined preference, but data may indicate that 
one option produces substantially greater patient well-being than the 
other, whether it is treatment A or treatment B. Patients might find 
themselves with no strong preference for a number of reasons. Patients 
might think that both options are equally unattractive. Or, they might 
                                                     
176. A related problem is that the patient and physician may rely on physical outcome data in 
choosing a treatment option and that data might conflict with well-being data. See infra section IV.B 
for further discussion. 
177. See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 145, at 325. 
178. Incidentally, this is a situation where outcome data and well-being data may dictate 
different courses of treatment. 
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have no real opinions about the options at all and are uninterested in 
forming them.179 Finally, patients may have no strong preference 
because their preferences are unstable and are constructed by decision-
making frames. For example, under one frame they prefer treatment A 
but under another they prefer treatment B.180 Current law yields 
undesirable results at points 3 and 4 because it suggests that patients 
must choose even in the absence of a preference or when their 
preferences are unstable and even though there is other data that would 
dictate a particular treatment choice.181 
Of course, both the x-axis (patient well-being) and the y-axis 
(strength of patient preference) reflect spectrums. A patient may have a 
relatively strong or weak preference for any given treatment and the 
well-being consequences of a treatment may be strongly implicated (e.g., 
quite likely to be welfare-maximizing) or weakly implicated (e.g., close 
call between options). 
D. Current Solutions Do Not Effectively Address the Problems 
This Article is not the first to acknowledge deficiencies in patient 
decision-making. The health care field in recent years has tried to 
address these challenges with a variety of methods intended to make the 
current autonomy-centric model better. For instance, scholars have 
suggested ways to improve patients’ medical literacy182 and to train 
physicians in decision theory to help guide the decision-making 
process.183 Scholars have argued that patients might be able to make 
better decisions if nurses or social workers presented the options rather 
                                                     
179. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 38, at 62–63 (discussing people being compelled 
to choose).  
180. See discussion supra notes 95–98. 
181. Some may argue that health care decisions are more important or personal in some ways 
than are other decisions that people make and that law influences. This is certainly true. 
Nonetheless, the highly emotional and incredibly challenging decisions that people make about 
healthcare are even more likely to produce biases and errors than are, for example, consumer 
decisions.  
182. Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic: The Role of Health Literacy in Health 
Care Access, Quality, & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 253, 276–326 (2011); Jessica J. Flinn, 
Personalizing Informed Consent: The Challenge of Health Literacy, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 379, 409–12 (2009). 
183. See, e.g., Jon Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational 
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321 (1990); Donald A. 
Redelmeier, Paul Rozin & Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and 
Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72 (1993) (suggesting teaching doctors clinical skills that 
consider the psychological elements that affect a patient’s decision about treatment). 
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than doctors.184 And scholars have suggested a variety of ways to debias 
patient decision-makers, including requiring that physicians use 
percentages in medical communications rather than probabilities to 
combat patient innumeracy, among others.185 Although these methods 
are well-intentioned and may add some value, they are unlikely to 
significantly improve patient well-being. 
Perhaps the most robust attempts to help patients make decisions that 
will improve their own welfare have come from the shared decision-
making (SDM) movement. This movement simply illustrates that it is 
both difficult and costly to debias patients and physicians. And if 
patients do not have stable preferences on which to draw, then debiasing 
serves no purpose. 
SDM is a theoretical model where physicians do not make decisions 
for patients, and patients are not left to make decisions unaided by 
physicians.186 Rather, SDM describes an ideally collaborative process 
where patients and health care providers make decisions together against 
a backdrop of the best scientific evidence and the patient’s own values 
and preferences.187 In practice, patient decision support tools, such as 
explanatory videos or other decision aids, lay out the risks and benefits 
of health care decisions for patients in the most objective way possible. 
The Affordable Care Act urges the adoption of certified decision aids.188 
And states are changing their laws to encourage the use of decision 
aids.189 
                                                     
184. Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL 
MED. 163, 204 (1984). 
185. Id. 
186. King & Moulton, supra note 30, at 480–91; David I. Shalowitz & Michael S. 
Wolf, Shared Decision-Making and the Lower Literate Patient, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 759, 762 
(2004) (“The model of shared decision-making is intended to provide a balanced structure for 
clinical consultations that both promotes patient autonomy and improves health outcomes.”). 
187. A related movement concerns patient engagement, which draws on work showing that 
patients actively involved in their own health care tend to have better outcomes. For instance, it 
encourages sharing of medical records with patients and more active education of patients so that 
they can meaningfully participate in care decisions. 
188. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42. U.S.C. § 3506 (2012) (decision aids for 
preference sensitive care). 
189. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.060 (2012) (Washington law making acknowledgment of use 
of decision aid prima facie evidence of informed consent); CHOOSING WISELY CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.choosingwisely.org/ [https://perma.cc/A7NZ-GVBE] (encouraging physicians and 
doctors to have conversations about the overuse of tests and procedures and supporting doctors’ 
efforts to make patients smart decision-makers). 
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Scholars have generally lauded SDM on the basis of studies that have 
found that SDM improves patient comfort with their decisions and may 
even improve patient health outcomes.190 One study found that decision 
aids can help combat the overtreatment problem.191 
SDM is an attempt, perhaps a valuable one, at providing more 
information to help patients make better decisions. To the extent that 
SDM provides information in a better way or makes people feel more 
connected to their choices and treatment, it may generate significant 
deontic autonomy value. Whether it is an efficient means for rooting out 
decision-making biases that undermine patient welfare, however, is a 
different issue. 
SDM and other decision aids are likely to be most effective when 
patients’ problems are informational, but they only address one of many 
judgment biases. Helping patients understand numbers and probabilities 
better is surely laudable and may be possible.192 Other features of 
judgment biases, however, are harder to correct.193 The effects of the 
order of options on peoples’ choices cannot be eradicated since one 
option always has to be presented first.194 Researchers have had very 
little luck eliminating affective forecasting errors, which loom 
enormously in the health care context.195 For example, asking subjects to 
consider the aspects of their lives that would not change following a 
disability had no significant effect on their predictions about how they 
would feel.196 As two prominent researchers explain, “no one has yet 
devised a method of making someone who does not have a colostomy 
                                                     
190. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 186, at 759–62. 
191. Dawn Stacey et al., Decision Aids for People Facing Health Treatment or Screening  
Decisions, COCHRANE LIBR. (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.cochrane.org/CD001431/COMMUN_ 
decision-aids-help-people-who-are-facing-health-treatment-or-screening-decisions 
[https://perma.cc/LW6U-3HR2] (finding that fully informed patients choose different choices than 
their physicians). 
192. However, debiasing for the overweighting of small probabilities has proven challenging. 
Jennifer Amsterlaw et al., Can Avoidance of Complications Lead to Biased Healthcare Decisions?, 
1 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 64, 64 (2006). 
193. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 71, at 114 (“However insightful the psychological 
literature is, it cannot equip lawmakers to mandate or disclosers to design disclosures that will 
rescue mandated disclosure.”). 
194. George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and 
Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE: HAPPINESS AND PUB. ECON.) 
1795, 1806 (2008) (discussing the challenges of informing and debiasing decision makers).  
195. See, e.g., Ubel et al., supra note 130, at 191; Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 136, at 131. 
196. Ubel et al., supra note 130, at 115–16. Some subjects gave even worse ratings. 
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appreciate what it would be like to have one, and especially to imagine 
having adapted to that colostomy after an extended period of time.”197 
Even where these efforts can be effective, however, efforts to debias 
can be expensive. They require additional (already scarce) medical 
resources.198 And the major premise of decision aids is that they are a 
neutral account of the risks and benefits of treatment options. As such, 
they may unintentionally exacerbate problems with the current model in 
that they leave patients with a lot of information and little actual 
guidance. Some critics believe that when employed by the government, 
debiasing efforts undermine the very autonomy that they intend to 
buttress.199 And they do nothing to address the fact that many people 
simply do not wish to make some sorts of choices.200 In a sense, it 
reduces autonomy to require patients to make decisions that they would 
rather not make for themselves.201 From the perspective of the heuristics 
and biases literature, trying to get patients to choose more wisely may be 
a deeply inefficient way to optimize patient welfare. 
The problems with debiasing emerge even more strongly when we 
recognize that patients may rarely have pre-existing stable preferences in 
the first place.202 The fundamental conceit of the debiasing literature’s 
approach to informed consent is that proper tools will provide patients 
the opportunity to express their true preferences about treatment. But if 
people do not have true preferences, if their preferences are instead 
constructed in the process of decision-making, then the basic premise of 
debiasing collapses.203 
                                                     
197. Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 194, at 1806. But see Sammy Almashat et al., Framing 
Effect Debiasing in Medical Decision Making, 71 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 102, 102 (2008) 
(demonstrating the possibility of diminishing bias and preventing framing effects by listing 
advantages and disadvantages of treatment options prior to making a choice). 
198. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 71, at 116–17 (“[E]xperience with other attempts 
to encourage rational and careful decisions suggests that even modest results require epic effort, 
ingenuity, and persistence.”). 
199. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 175, at 231–33. 
200. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 71, at 62 (“[M]any patients reject the gift of 
decision.”); see also Peter H. Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. 
405, 422 (2010) (“[P]eople often prefer not to make decisions by procrastinating, leaving decisions 
to others, making second-order decisions, or avoiding decisions in morally difficult and emotionally 
charged situations.”). 
201. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword to NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 12 (Sunstein 
argues that “often individuals actually prefer not to choose for themselves” and forcing them to 
choose is a form of paternalism). 
202. Id. (“People often have malleable notions of what is best for themselves, notions that are often 
constructed on the fly in a given situation.”). 
203. Some proponents of SDM argue that its purpose is, at least in part, to help patients elucidate 
 
07 - Epstein.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017 10:17 AM 
1292 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1255 
 
This seems particularly likely to be true in the context of medical 
decision-making. Most people have a very strong preference to avoid 
pain. Most people also have a very strong preference to avoid death. 
Most people do not, however, have consistent and stable preferences 
about the amount and degree of pain that they are willing to endure to 
avoid death.204 People may have strong desires to treat their diseases, but 
they also have strong desires to avoid side effects. Again, it is doubtful 
that most people have well-formed beliefs about the nature of different 
treatment options and the kinds and degrees of side effects that they 
cause. The efficacy of SDM in significantly improving patient welfare is 
questionable. 
The next part introduces the literature on choice architecture before 
Part IV explains the specific reform proposal for health care decision-
making. 
III. AUTONOMY, WELFARE, AND CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
When the autonomy values and well-being values conflict, one 
possibility is to prioritize one value and sacrifice the other. When 
medicine was deeply paternalistic, the system prioritized patient well-
being (in an admittedly flawed way) and sacrificed patient autonomy. In 
the current regime, the system prioritizes patient autonomy (also in a 
flawed way) and sacrifices patient well-being. Both options create 
profound normative problems. Libertarian paternalism offers a middle 
course—a way to promote well-being without sacrificing autonomy—by 
encouraging people to make choices that are good for them.205 
A. Nudge: Promoting Well-Being with Respect for Autonomy 
“Libertarian paternalism” is a term that was first coined by Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein to refer to a regulatory system that “steer[s] 
people’s choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own 
                                                     
their preferences (not just to deliver information). It may be true that SDM as a method of 
preference elucidation is helpful for deontic reasons, but I am skeptical that this is so for welfarist 
reasons. SDM, in theory, would be most helpful where the welfare consequences of a decision do 
not point clearly to one choice over another and a patient’s preferences provide a reasonable proxy 
for which choice is better for her.  
204. See Paul Dolan & Robert Metcalfe, Valuing Health: A Brief Report on Subjective Well-
Being Versus Preferences, 32 MED. DECISION MAKING 578, 581 (2012) (noting that preference-
elicitation methods will draw attention to particular aspects of a health state and ignore other 
features of it). 
205. See NUDGE, supra note 6, at 4–6.  
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welfare” without choosing for them.206 It responds to problems in the 
autonomy-centric approach—people make bad decisions—and to a 
backlash against hard paternalism where the government coerces people 
to protect them from themselves. Libertarian paternalism envisions a 
“choice architect” who creates an environment that encourages people to 
make better decisions.207 The things that a choice architect does to 
influence people to make good decisions are called a “nudge” because 
they encourage people to choose in one way but leave open the 
possibility of making a different choice.208 Examples of nudges range 
from more prominently displaying the healthy food in a buffet line209 to 
redesigning a physician’s electronic prescribing pad to make it easier for 
the physician to prescribe generic medication and more onerous to 
prescribe a brand name drug210 to informing customers about their 
neighbors’ lower electricity usage to encourage energy conservation.211 
A vast literature has developed in the last two decades that explores 
nudges that “do not force anyone to do anything and that maintain 
freedom of choice, but that have the potential to make people healthier, 
wealthier, and happier.”212 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous example of a nudge is changing a default 
rule.213 A default rule sets the choice for a person who does not 
choose.214 So for instance, assume the default is that people are not 
organ donors. If they want to become organ donors, they have to opt-in. 
                                                     
206. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003); see also Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian 
Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003) (discussing the ways in which libertarian paternalists 
might make choices).  
207. See NUDGE, supra note 6, at 3. 
208. Id. at 4; see also NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174. 
209. See, e.g., Brian Wansink & Andrew S. Hanks, Slim by Design: Serving Healthy Foods First 
in Buffet Line Improves Overall Meal Selection, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013) (finding the order in which 
food is presented at a buffet triggers different individual choices). 
210. See Christopher T. Robertson et al., Introduction to NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 
6. 
211. P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive and Reconstructive Power of Social 
Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 432–33 (2007).  
212. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (2013); see also NUDGE, 
supra note 6, at 6–8. 
213. There are myriad other examples of nudges that governments (or private actors) might 
employ to encourage “better” decision-making. See, e.g., WHY NUDGE, supra note 121. 
214. See Willis, supra note 8, at 1157 (“Defaults are settings or rules about the way products, 
policies, or legal relationships function that apply unless users, affected citizens, or parties take 
action to change them.”); Craig R. M. McKenzie, Michael J. Liersch & Stacey R. Finkelstein, 
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 414, 414 (2006). 
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Although this small effort would not seem to be enough to shift people’s 
behavior about something as important as organ donation, choice of the 
default often has a profound effect. One study that compared rates of 
organ donation in opt-in countries with those in opt-out countries found 
that nearly 60 percentage points separated the two groups (the opt-ins 
versus the opt-outs).215 Changing the default is a nudge in the sense that 
it is a change that a choice architect makes to encourage organ donation. 
It does not, however, make the decision for people, who are still free to 
opt-out of the default. 
Default choices are often effective at nudging people toward a 
particular choice because they are “sticky,” meaning that more 
consumers will remain in the default position than would do so if active 
choice were required.216 Defaults may be sticky for neoclassical 
economic reasons—if the imposition of transaction costs for switching 
deters consumers from opting out of the default217—or for behavioral 
reasons. For instance, the status quo bias suggests that people often 
prefer to keep things the same rather than make active changes.218 
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser first demonstrated the 
status quo bias in an experiment comparing decisions subjects made 
from a neutral condition to those subjects made when one option was 
designated the status quo.219 They found that when an option was 
presented as the status quo, it received the most selections.220 In the 
neutral frame, it received a middle amount of selections.221 And when it 
was the alternative to the status quo, it received the fewest selections.222 
                                                     
215. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338, 1339 (2003); 
see also Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 651, 655 (2006) (reviewing the literature finding that individuals are biased to “stick” with 
the status quo). 
216. See Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 61 
(2014); see, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract 
Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 215. 
217. See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure 
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1422–24 (2014).  
218. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (discussing a series of decision-making experiments 
which show that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo).  
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There are several reasons that choosers may select the status quo 
more frequently. There may be an inertia to simply retain the choice that 
has seemingly already been made. Choosers may perceive the default as 
being endorsed by authorities, making them more likely to stick with 
it.223 Or because of loss aversion, choosers may weigh potential losses 
from opting out of the default rule more heavily than potential gains.224 
In general, experiments have found that the bias is heightened the more 
choices that are presented and the less strongly a person holds a 
preference.225 Robust experimental evidence suggests, however, that 
most default rules are sticky.226 
Despite the promise of libertarian paternalism generally, though, it is 
not without critics. Although it is certainly less paternalistic than flat out 
regulation, there is still an element of coercion that many argue is 
particularly problematic when effectuated by the government.227 After 
all, lawmakers and policymakers are making choices intended to 
influence the decisions that individuals make. If the job of government, 
as Mill contended, is to prevent harm to others but otherwise to not 
intervene in an individual’s sovereign life,228 libertarian paternalism fails 
the test. 
In general, though, the paternalism that a nudge requires is mild 
compared to alternatives, and that paternalism is less objectionable if the 
                                                     
223. See NUDGE, supra note 6, at 26. 
224. See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 315, 322 (2009) (concluding “the finding of large default effects is one of the most 
robust results in the applied economics literature of the last ten years”); Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 
194–95 (1991); James Powers, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and the Federal 
Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027, 1051 (2014). 
225. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 218, at 8. 
226. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 608, 611–12, 637–47 (1998) (compiling results finding that contracting parties prefer 
default terms and tend not to deviate from the default); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default 
Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279, 291–92, 305 
(2009) (examining the impact of default options on transaction costs in corporate law contexts); 
Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Information Presentation and 
Pro-Environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63, 67–69 (2008) (discussing the results of a 
study offering participants the choice between two suppliers—one default, the other alternative—
which showed sixty-eight percent of participants chose the default supplier). For a review of the 
literature on the stickiness of default rules, see Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 215, at 655–60. 
227. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Nudge Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/ opinion/brooks-the-nudge-debate.html 
[https://perma.cc/7S5K 
-EDQ8] (summarizing common arguments). 
228. See MILL, supra note 37, at 80. 
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nudge is transparent. Also consider that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to entirely avoid aspects of paternalism in presenting choices. With most 
decisions, it is impossible to entirely avoid framing effects. Being more 
thoughtful about framing a choice to benefit the well-being of the 
greatest number of people seems less problematic against that backdrop. 
To be sure, one must be bothered by bad individual decision-making to 
be willing to tolerate some (even small) sense of government 
manipulation of choices. But it is hard to imagine many people being 
happy with a state of the world where people left to their own devices 
often make choices that make their lives go worse.229 In general, 
objections to paternalistic approaches are muted if they “impose small 
costs, or no material costs, on those who seek to go their own way,”230 
which is the case where opting out is easy to do. 
As to default rules specifically, there are also a number of common 
criticisms. For one, default rules are usually sticky, but there are counter-
examples. The default rule upon marriage is that both spouses retain 
their last names. And yet the vast majority of women nonetheless opt-out 
of that default and take their husbands’ last names.231 
Lauren Willis has described that some defaults can actually be 
slippery rather than sticky. She suggests that this is particularly so when 
motivated firms with access to consumers uncertain about their choice 
take actions to oppose operation of the default.232 Willis gives the 
example of bank overdraft fees.233 Regulators wanted the default to be 
overdraft coverage so that consumers would not overdraw their accounts 
and incur fees. But overdraft fees are quite lucrative for banks, 
motivating banks to move people out of the default position. There is 
some evidence that banks were able to effectively influence consumers 
to opt-out of the overdraft coverage.234 Perhaps most troubling, opt-out 
                                                     
229. Certainly, opposition to nudges on the basis of coercion exists, but how strongly this view 
is held seems to be affected by social norms. One major study, for instance, found broad support in 
six European nations for the majority of nudges tested. See Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
Europeans Like Nudges?, 11 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING, 310, 310–25 (2016) (finding broad 
support in six European nations for the majority of nudges tested because “if people believe that a 
nudge has legitimate goals and think that it fits with the interests or values of most people, they are 
overwhelmingly likely to favor it”). 
230. See WHY NUDGE, supra note 121, at 143. 
231. Vivia Chen, Why Not Take the Wife’s Last Name?, NAT’L L.J., June 3, 2013. Interestingly, 
no data seems to exist, yet, on trends in last names after same sex marriages. 
232. Willis, supra note 8, at 1174. 
233. Id. at 1174–85. 
234. Id. at 1200. 
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rates were highest for those most likely to incur overdraft fees.235 Willis 
attributes this result to both bank motivation and consumer uncertainty 
about their choice. She posits that in areas where interests are aligned, 
like in the retirement savings context where the employer, plan provider, 
and employee all tend to benefit from greater participation, defaults are 
more likely to be sticky and effectively nudge behavior to the desired 
ends.236 As a result, it is important when attempting to strategically use 
defaults to consider what might influence consumers to opt out of the 
default. 
Another criticism of nudging through defaults is that a default must 
be selected for an entire population, and, as a result, is a blunt 
instrument. In a given population, not everyone’s well-being will be 
maximized by deciding the same way. But the default must nonetheless 
be the same for everyone.237 Some have argued that defaults therefore 
work best in situations where there is a high degree of homogeneity 
among the actors.238 
Another plausible response, however, is that in the face of 
heterogeneity, defaults could be personalized. Alexander Capron and 
Donna Spruijt-Metz discuss how the collection of individualized “small 
data”—about individuals’ habits and activities and statuses—collected 
by personal devices has the potential to provide what they call 
“personalized paternalism.”239 
The last common criticism of nudging through defaults is that it can 
be hard to select the default.240 Policymakers are prone to their own 
biases and must also consider whether the default should be what is best 
for the individual or what is best for society.241 Nudging through defaults 
seems to work particularly well where “policy-makers are highly 
confident about what choices and decisions will maximize the welfare of 
most actors” and where there are “few negative externalities created by 
                                                     
235. Id. at 1184. 
236. Id. at 1159–60. 
237. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 217, at 1427 (“Default rules are often tailored for different 
types of transactions or contexts. But as far as we can tell, they are not usually tailored to the 
personal characteristics of the parties.”). 
238. NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 17–18.  
239. Id. at 241. 
240. See NUDGE, supra note 6. 
241. See infra section IV.B for a discussion of data available to guide the selection of defaults in 
health care decision-making. 
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individual choices.”242 We can also draw comfort, however, from 
evidence that bad defaults tend not to be sticky—in other words, people 
do opt-out.243 
In general, employing nudges requires careful consideration of these 
issues. Defaults are better employed in certain contexts than in others. 
But as the next subpart explores, defaults have been successfully 
employed to nudge individuals to choices that will increase their well-
being in other areas of the law. 
B. Other Areas Have Responded to Biased Decision-Making with 
Nudges (While Health Care Decision-Making Has Not) 
A curious feature of health law’s commitment to autonomy as a 
welfare proxy is the extent to which the commitment is held by scholars 
who seem to be open to versions of regulation and paternalism (whether 
hard or soft) in other legal contexts.244 Indeed, many areas of the law 
have recognized that even with proper disclosures, people do not always 
make the decisions that would maximize their own utility and have 
evolved to protect people from making poor decisions. Some laws 
directly proscribe undesirable choices through regulation and the use of 
penalties or incentives.245 However, the focus here is on how nudges 
have been employed to address human error in decision-making. 
                                                     
242. NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 17–18. 
243. See generally John Beshears et. al., The Limitations of Defaults (NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RES.: RET. RES. CTR., Working Paper No. NB 10-02, 2010), 
http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/orrc10-02.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7WD-6BL3]. 
244. Compare, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining 
Treatment Without Consent: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 215 (2013) (lamenting physician failure to follow the “principle of patient 
autonomy” in administering life sustaining treatment without consent during the past century) with 
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity: Justifiability of Strong Hard 
Paternalism in Public Health Regulation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1859 (2014) (arguing for paternalistic 
public health regulation). But see Roberts & Leonard, supra note 58 (acknowledging that 
paternalism to promote health and well-being, despite intentionally constraining individual liberty 
and autonomy, may be desirable); NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 3 (noting that in health law 
and policy, “[t]he traditional tools have been sticks and carrots—penalties and incentives”). 
245. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); 
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation 
Z), 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2016) (preventing mortgage companies from offering certain subprime 
mortgages); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4(c) (2016) (setting a minimum wage preventing individuals 
from agreeing to work for less pay); CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE §§ 5-12-170, 5-12-080 (2000) 
(preventing people from waiving their right to withhold rent if a property violates standards of 
habitability). Even other areas of health law have more strongly embraced paternalism, although 
there has now been backlash. As an example, a patient cannot take a drug not yet approved by the 
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The most prominent example addresses the problem that Americans 
tend not to save enough money for retirement.246 Most U.S. employers 
require employees who would like to participate in a 401(k) or other 
defined contribution retirement plan to opt in.247 If an employee opts in, 
the employer will automatically transfer a certain percentage of the 
employee’s paycheck each month to the retirement savings plan (and in 
many cases, the employer will match that contribution). When some 
employers changed the default and automatically enrolled employees in 
a plan (but permitted opting out), rates of participation vastly increased. 
In one study, changing the default to automatic enrollment resulted in 
nearly twice as many new hires participating as when the default 
required opting in.248 Similarly, Great Britain changed the default on 
corporate pension plans to automatically enroll employees while 
allowing opt-out and has seen positive results.249 
Policy defaults have also been employed to encourage individuals 
with large mortgages to escrow funds for their taxes and insurance250 and 
to nudge voters to vote by automatically registering citizens to vote but 
providing information on how to decline voter registration.251 In 
Germany, the government has successfully nudged citizens to use green 
                                                     
FDA. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008). But see RIGHT TO TRY, http://righttotry.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Q67-4U9P]. 
246. See Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic Workplace 
Retirement Plans, 91 IND. L.J. 505, 506 (2016) (citing Personal Saving Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK 
ST. LOUIS (Oct. 30, 2015, 7:46 AM), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PSAVERT 
[perma.cc/2CLQ-HU7R]) (“The personal saving rate in the United States in October 2015 was 
4.8%.”). 
247. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149 (2001). 
248. See William E. Nessmith et al., Measuring the Effectiveness of Automatic Enrollment, 31 
VANGUARD CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 1, 6 (2007); John Beshears et al., Public Policy and Saving 
for Retirement: The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, in BETTER LIVING 
THROUGH ECONOMICS 274, 287 (John J. Siegfried ed., 2010) (finding clear evidence that automatic 
enrollment increased savings and financial well-being); see, e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 247 
(finding that employers’ retirement savings plan defaults shape employees’ enrollment decisions). 
249. See Nudge Nudge, Think Think, ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.economist. 
com/node/21551032 [https://perma.cc/8BQ4-GN9C]. 
250. See Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b)(3) (2016). 
251. See 2015 Or. Laws ch. 8 (codified in scattered sections of OR. REV. STAT. §§ 246–247); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE 14 (2016) (discussing Oregon’s automatic voter registration system which provides 
citizens the opportunity to opt out of registration).  
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energy by automatically enrolling them in the green energy program but 
permitting opt-out.252 
These are examples of nudges intended to benefit the individual, and 
in many cases, by extension, to benefit society. Other defaults are 
strategically designed primarily to benefit society and not the individual. 
The classic study on changing the organ donation default, discussed 
earlier, is one such example.253 There are additional ones, as well. For 
instance, the Washington State Revenue Code sets as the default that 
citizens registering their cars automatically donate five dollars to the 
state’s parks, although they have the opportunity to opt out of the 
donation if they so choose.254 
The final Part argues that the health care decision-making context is 
particularly well-suited to use of a nudge and therefore proposes a new 
default to promote patient well-being. 
IV. A NUDGE TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE DECISION-
MAKING 
The dominant view in legal and policy scholarship to date has been 
that the autonomy and well-being values in health care decision-making 
are generally aligned because patients will make choices that are in their 
own self-interest.255 As Part II illustrated, blind faith in this alignment is 
no longer tenable. Patients may choose what is best for their well-being, 
but they may not. Implementing a default treatment option, driven by 
patient outcome and well-being data, would simplify treatment decisions 
for patients and move more patients toward the choice that would be best 
for them. Yet the patient would still ultimately be able to make her own 
treatment choices, hence preserving autonomy. Nudging patients to 
better decisions256 would benefit not only individual patients but also the 
almost three trillion dollars health care industry writ large. While there 
are some challenges in this approach, it is superior to the other options, 
                                                     
252. Pichert & Katsikopoulos, supra note 226, at 64. 
253. Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 215; see also Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 215. 
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.16A.090(3) (2017). 
255. See supra notes 67–72. Note that when they do conflict, current doctrine generally assumes 
that autonomy must prevail. 
256. Of course some physician nudging of patient decision-making already takes place. Many 
physicians encourage patients, sometimes subtly and sometimes quite directly, to choose the option 
the physician prefers. In a way, the nudge described in this Part is meant to influence not only the 
patient, but also the physician, whose current attempts to influence the patient may or may not be in 
the patient’s best interests. 
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including the primary policy focus in recent years, which has been to try 
to debias patients through decision aids. 
A. Nudging Patients to Increase Well-Being by Establishing a Default 
If patient choice often does not lead to increased patient well-being, 
then the question is what the law might do to remedy that problem. More 
specifically, how should the law react where patients have strong 
preferences (or doctors have strong preferences), but those preferences 
will not maximize their well-being, or where patients do not have strong 
preferences, but we can identify the choice that will maximize their well-
being?257 Policymakers should implement a nudge in the form of 
establishing a treatment default.258 The default addresses the two 
scenarios that are most problematic for current doctrine. 
Currently, informed consent law contemplates that physicians lay out 
a menu of treatment options for patients, describing the risks involved 
with each option. But nothing in the law requires that physicians 
promote any particular option over another.259 Instead, the law should 
require that a patient be presented the default treatment for their 
condition, with the default being as personalized as possible given 
available data.260 The default treatment would be the one that data 
dictate would be the best for the patient.261 The patient would still be 
provided with other options and would have the opportunity to opt out of 
the default treatment option if desired. But if the default is sticky—and it 
likely would be—then establishing the default would move more 
patients to the decisions that would most likely increase their well-being. 
                                                     
257. See supra section II.C. for further discussion. 
258. See Scott D. Halpern et al., Harnessing the Power of Default Options to Improve Health 
Care, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1340, 1340–41 (2007) (discussing various kinds of default options in 
medical practice). Note that a treatment default is not necessarily synonymous with what is often 
termed “standard of care,” defined according to custom and practice in medical malpractice law. 
Infra section IV.B. discusses further. 
259. Indeed, physicians might not even know which option will be most welfare-enhancing, but 
they should be made to know. See discussion at infra section IV.B. 
260. As technology advances and more data are collected, these default options could be 
increasingly catered to the individual’s heterogeneous characteristics. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 48 (2013) (describing how defaults can be 
personalized just as smartphone data is mined to personalize services); supra note 159. 
261. See infra section IV.B. for a discussion of the relevant data and how it would be used to 
select the default. Also note that undoubtedly, some doctors are already attempting to nudge patients 
toward the treatment the doctor prefers. But doctors, too, are subject to biases that can result in their 
preferred treatment choice not being the best choice for the patient. Requiring that the default be 
established based on data accordingly has the effect of nudging not just the patient but also the 
doctor. 
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In a sense, the default would work as a form of “decision 
simplification:” a means to “enhance the ability of individuals to make 
decisions that maximize their own subjective expected utility by 
combining and presenting information in ways that simplify the relevant 
choice.”262 A default would reduce costs associated with individuals 
having to learn about a menu of options and would be particularly useful 
in health care decision-making contexts that are often unfamiliar and 
complicated.263 By presenting a treatment as the default option, the 
patient is encouraged to select it.264 The strategic presentation of an 
option as the default is preferable to simply giving patients a list of 
options established randomly or by convenience, leaving patients 
without proper tools to make the best decision.265 
Returning to the example of the fifty-five-year-old woman with back 
pain, assume that data suggest that physical therapy is the treatment 
option that would most increase her well-being and that spinal fusion 
surgery would be significantly worse for her.266 Under the nudge 
proposal, the patient would be told by her physician that the default 
course of treatment is physical therapy. If she consents to be treated, that 
will be the treatment provided. The patient would be told that there are 
other options, as well, but they have been shown to be worse for most 
similarly situated patients.267 Those options include spinal fusion 
surgery. The patient could choose to opt out of the recommended option 
and instead receive the spinal fusion surgery. A patient with a strong 
preference for surgery over physical therapy might do so. But most 
patients would likely accept the recommended (default) option.268 
                                                     
262. See NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 21. 
263. See Sunstein, supra note 260, at 47. 
264. Nudging is a tool that “incline[s] people’s choices in a particular direction.” Id. at 5. Here, 
by presenting a treatment choice as the preferred option, and by requiring a patient who prefers 
another choice to opt out, patients would be strongly encouraged to make the welfare-maximizing 
choice. But they would not be forced to do so. 
265. Halpern et al., supra note 258, at 1342 (“Too often, default options are set on the basis of 
convenience or natural ordering, rather than by careful consideration of their consequences.”). 
266. One clear challenge is in determining what it means to be significantly “worse” from a 
well-being perspective. See discussion at infra section IV.B. 
267. Certainly, the data on which the default was selected could be provided to interested 
patients in the interest of transparency. See infra section IV.B. for further discussion of the data. 
268. Peter Ubel notes a number of additional psychological benefits that can arise from 
physician recommendations, including shifting perceptions of what constitutes omission and 
commission, shifting the locus of decision-making responsibility, and changing perceptions of 
losses and gains. Peter A. Ubel, “What Should I Do, Doc?” Some Psychological Benefits of 
Physician Recommendations, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 977, 978 (2002). 
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Indeed, the default is likely to be sticky because it sends a strong signal 
to patients that policymakers, informed by relevant data, ascribe to the 
choice selected by the default. 
The health care decision-making context is, in many ways, 
particularly ripe for nudging.269 Patients frequently resist making 
medical decisions, particularly as they become older and sicker and their 
decisions become more consequential.270 Also, while the argument has 
frequently been made that health care decisions only affect the 
individual, it is simply not the case. The health care system bears the 
costs of unnecessary medical procedures, and in many cases, the 
consequences of poor decisions more generally, as does society, which 
benefits when its citizens are the most productive and the happiest that 
they can be.271 
The implementation of a default where there previously was none is 
somewhat different from changing an opt-in default to an opt-out default 
as in the case of the organ donation studies.272 Nonetheless, it is a 
reasonable assumption that presenting the choice in this manner will 
cause many more patients to obtain the welfare-maximizing treatment 
than the other option.273 In a sense, this solution is analogous to other 
                                                     
269. See Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics 
Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189, 1190 (2009) (“Given the pervasive complexity and 
ambiguity of medical decisionmaking, it is somewhat surprising that behavioral analysis has not 
garnered greater attention among scholars or policy makers.”); Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship 
Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 JAMA 
1709, 1712–14 (1998) (describing particular decision-making problems for terminally ill patients). 
270. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 46, at 727–28 (noting that “[w]hen one study 
asked patients whether they wanted information, their mean score was 80 on a 0–100 scale; when 
asked if they wanted to make their own decisions, the mean score was 33”); Sunstein, supra note 
12, at 1–2. Mark White agrees that the unique nature of health care may justify nudges. But he 
cautions: “given the inherently personal nature of health choices, even greater care should be taken 
than in cases of ordinary consumer decisions to ensure that patients are as involved in decision-
making as possible without having their autonomy compromised by any kind of paternalistic 
intervention.” NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 73. 
271. See Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral Age, 
125 YALE L.J. 226, 232 (2015) (noting that nudges that benefit society are less problematic). 
272. Laura Kressel and colleagues show how shifting from opt-in to opt-out defaults can 
dramatically change people’s choices regarding end-of-life care. Laura M. Kressel et al., The 
Influence of Default Options on the Expression of End-of-Life Treatment Preferences in Advance 
Directives, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1007, 1009 (2007). Other versions of defaults in medical 
care include opt-outs for HIV testing or vaccination and defaulting to generic versions of 
medications unless physicians specify name brand versions. Halpern et al., supra note 258, at 1340. 
273.  Halpern et al., supra note 258, at 1341. 
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laws where the government establishes a default option for the purpose 
of encouraging individuals to make one choice over another.274 
For instance, New Jersey established a default for auto insurance of a 
“limited tort option.” Insurance carriers in the state must offer motorists, 
as the default, a policy where the motorist agrees to give up her right to 
sue for non-economic damages in the event of a car accident.275 
Motorists can, by law, opt out of that default and agree to pay a higher 
premium to retain full future rights to sue (the “unrestricted rights” 
option).276 Pennsylvania established the exact opposite default 
scheme.277 The unrestricted rights option is the default there, but 
motorists can instead opt for the limited tort option. Despite the fact that 
the rules were opposite, a strong majority accepted the default rule in 
both states.278 The concept is similar to how the default approach to 
medical treatment would work. Just as insurers must offer a certain 
policy default, physicians would be required to offer a certain treatment 
default. 
It seems particularly likely that where the patient herself has no strong 
preference—one of the areas where current informed consent doctrine is 
particularly problematic—the default will be sticky.279 There is ample 
evidence from other contexts that establishing a default is particularly 
effective at moving choosers to better decisions where the chooser has 
no strong preference or where the decision is complex.280 
The default may be less sticky, however, for the patients with strong 
preferences for the less welfare-enhancing treatment. In other words, 
patients with strong preferences for the worse choice may opt out in 
                                                     
274. The suggestion is similar to a proposal to use defaults to encourage patients to choose the 
cheaper treatment when two options are equally good for them. Elizabeth Bogdan-Lovis & 
Margaret Holmes-Rovner, Prudent Evidence-Fettered Shared Decision Making, 16 J. EVALUATION 
IN CLINICAL PRAC. 376 (2010). Also related, Alexander Capron and Donna Spruijt-Metz propose 
that a physician might present a treatment choice as a default, but for the purpose of “reinforc[ing] 
the patient’s connection with the treatment selected.” See NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 
240. 
275. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-3.1 (West 2009). 
276. The two types of policies are also referred to as the basic option (the default) and the 
standard option (available by opting out of the default). 
277. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1701–1705 (2016) (known as the Act 6 Amendments to the PA 
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL)). 
278. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 238 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
279. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 5. 
280. Id. 
07 - Epstein.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017 10:17 AM 
2017] NUDGING PATIENT DECISION-MAKING 1305 
 
larger numbers than patients who lack strong preferences.281 But even if 
some percentage of that group could be persuaded to choose the better 
option because of the portrayal of the better option as the default, it 
would be an improvement over the status quo. Only a hard paternalistic 
solution, which would entirely sacrifice self-determination, would be 
more likely to move this population to the better option. But for the 
reasons already discussed, hard paternalism seems untenable.282 
Indeed, some will argue that even this soft paternalistic nudge has 
negative implications for individual liberty. It is undoubtedly true that 
there is an element of paternalism in nudges. Certainly, however, the 
default approach is less coercive than regulation would be. A patient can 
still readily opt out of the choice and choose the treatment option that is 
more likely to be welfare-reducing.283 One can imagine legitimate 
reasons that an individual may prefer an option that is welfare-
reducing—perhaps to selflessly improve the welfare of someone else. 
The sense that patients still have decisional authority might also increase 
patient well-being if feeling like they have a choice in and of itself 
makes them happier.284 
Another concern is that physicians who do not agree with the default 
will influence patients to opt out of it. Regarding default rules in general, 
those with access to and influence over decision-makers and who have 
incentives to convince the decision-makers to opt out, may have the 
ability to prompt opt-out.285 For instance, assume that the fifty-five-year-
old woman with back pain sees a surgeon who is motivated to increase 
demand for his surgical services. The surgeon might dutifully 
communicate that the default treatment is physical therapy but 
nonetheless try to convince the patient to opt out of that default and 
choose surgery. The default will not necessarily disabuse physicians of 
their own cognitive and unconscious biases that might cause their 
opinion to conflict with the data.286 
                                                     
281. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 8, at 1155. This may also be true for patients who are highly 
influenced by doctors where the doctor has a strong preference for the less welfare-enhancing 
treatment. 
282. See supra section I.C. 
283. See Halpern et al., supra note 258, at 1343 (“Because people frequently lack established 
preferences regarding their health care choices, those in positions to set default options should use 
them to achieve legitimate and important health care goals.”). 
284. I concede, however, that the mere presentation of a choice as the default will appear to 
some patients as an infringement on decision-making autonomy. 
285. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 8, at 1179. 
286. In addition to concern about doctors, medical device manufacturers and other interested 
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On the other hand, there is reason to be hopeful that this effect would 
be muted. At present, the only legal obligation that doctors have is to 
offer patients the treatment options that either a “reasonably prudent” 
doctor practicing in the field would or that a patient would want to know 
before making the decision.287 And to avoid medical malpractice 
liability, they must, in general, use minimally sound medical judgment 
and render minimally competent care.288 While physicians have 
continuing education requirements and generally must keep up with the 
standard of care, there is no obligation to know what treatment option 
will most increase patient well-being. Implementing the envisioned 
nudge would change this. Physicians would have to be apprised of this 
information, which in and of itself, is a useful endeavor.289 In other 
words, the default nudges not only the patient but also the physician. 
There is also reason to believe that levels of altruism, despite some 
heterogeneity, are high in the medical field.290 At base, a physician 
recommending medical treatment is simply not the same as a bank 
wanting to increase its profit. Despite heterogeneity, we might assume 
that most doctors will want patients to have the treatment that will be the 
best for them. Finally, to the extent that doctors are acting in line with 
financial incentives that might cause conflict between the treatment 
default and the physician’s interests (e.g., the physician recommending 
surgery to increase personal compensation when it is not the best option 
for the patient), programs are already underway to reward providers 
based on the quality of care they provide.291 The idea is to counter the 
current economic incentive that physicians might have to offer 
expensive, high volume, low-quality care.292 
                                                     
entities might also market directly to consumers to attempt to move consumers off of the default. 
287. See supra section I.C.3. 
288. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilburn, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985). 
289. See Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics 
Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189, 1197 (2009) (citing studies showing physicians 
overestimate their own abilities and rely too heavily on habit and individual clinical experience in 
prescribing practices and choice of services). 
290. See Matteo Galizzi et. al, Provider Altruism in Health Economics, NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH 
 & WELFARE (Apr. 2015), https://www.julkari.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/125787/THL_Discussion_ 
Paper_Altruism_4-2015%20(2).pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2Q67-4U9P].  
291. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 4 (discussing move from fee for service to incentive-based 
compensation for providers in health care). 
292. Id. (suggesting that incentive-based compensation may be more effective for certain types 
of health care than others). 
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Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, is in determining which 
treatments should have a default, and what the default treatment should 
be. Just how much better does one option have to be for it to become the 
default? Which institutions should be responsible for regulating and 
enforcing defaults—state legislatures, medical associations, or courts? 
And how specifically can the default be tailored to the individual 
patient’s characteristics?293 The next subpart starts the conversation on 
these difficult questions. 
B. Data to Help Select Defaults 
The default choice must be based on data and selected by an 
independent entity.294 Medical associations, or perhaps a newly 
convened regulatory body, are best positioned to utilize the data to make 
such decisions. These policymakers have two key data sources upon 
which to draw: health outcome data and hedonic data. 
Health outcome data used to be synonymous with morbidity and 
mortality rates. But there has been a data revolution, and outcome data 
now spans a vast range of health states. Not only mortality, but also 
physiologic measures such as blood pressure, laboratory test results such 
as serum cholesterol or reductions in hemoglobin A1C in diabetic 
patients,295 and patient-reported health states such as functional status 
and symptoms may all be used as outcome measures.296 
These data are collected in many different ways. Some are collected 
by clinical trials. Other data is collected by physicians in the course of 
                                                     
293. One argument for active choosing is the heterogeneity of individual preferences. Because 
the conception of well-being adopted here is not based in preference satisfaction, this concern is not 
crippling. Heterogeneity of patient characteristics that impact which choice will be welfare-
maximizing, however, is important to consider. A world where defaults can be personalized by 
reference to data is not far off. As Cass Sunstein suggests, “personalized default rules might be 
thought to produce the best of both worlds. Like impersonal default rules, they reduce the burdens 
of decision and simplify life. But like active choosing, they promote individualization and increase 
accuracy by overcoming the many problems associated with one-size-fits-all approaches.” Sunstein, 
supra note 7, at 48. 
294. Physicians are subject to their own biases in recommending treatment options, and 
therefore the choice of default cannot simply be delegated to physicians. 
295. Julia James, Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php [https://perma.cc/9PR9-Q8KG]; A1C Test 
Overview, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/a1c-test/home/ovc-20167930 
[https://perma.cc/4G57-2DJX].  
296. See Selecting Health Outcome Measures for Clinical Quality Measurement, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, https://www.qualitymeasures.ahrq.gov/help-and-about/ 
quality-measure-tutorials/selecting-outcome-measures [https://perma.cc/E4F7-6N76]. 
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treatment, becoming a part of a patient’s electronic medical record. 
Much data is also being collected in less traditional ways. For instance, 
personal devices and internet devices (Fitbit, Patients like me, etc.) are 
now specifically designed to collect health information. And the growing 
field of mobile health (mHealth) means that patients are and will 
increasingly be monitored by mobile sensing technologies.297 All sorts of 
outcome data are reported to the government, commercial payers, and 
non-profits like the LeapFrog Group (that collects and reports on quality 
information nationwide) and the International Consortium for Health 
Outcomes Measurement (ICHOM) (that works to standardize the 
measuring and reporting of patient outcomes). 
In particular, the last decade has seen significant funding directed to 
Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER), which the Institute of 
Medicine defines as “the generation and synthesis of evidence that 
compares the benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, 
diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the 
delivery of care.”298 Indeed, the Affordable Care Act established the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute in 2010 specifically to 
further this sort of research.299 The goal of funding CER is to obtain 
better data about the relative effectiveness (with reference to value) of 
different medical interventions.300 Although there is much work still to 
be done, this data, and health outcome data in general, can be very useful 
in helping to direct a treatment default and can often provide clear 
direction. 
But it also does not tell the full story in the sense that it does not 
instruct whether people’s decisions actually increase their well-being. 
The early twentieth-century behavioral revolution in the social sciences 
led to an abandonment of attempts to measure internal mental states like 
happiness or satisfaction, but the emerging field of hedonic psychology 
has put these issues back on the table.301 It has provided valid measures 
                                                     
297. See, e.g., Santosh Kumar et. al, Mobile Health Technology Evaluation: The mHealth 
Evidence Workshop, 45 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 228 (2013) (describing how mHealth 
technologies have the ability to improve well-being). 
298. Harold S. Sox, Defining Comparative Effectiveness Research: The Importance of Getting It 
Right, 48 MED. CARE S7, S7 (2010). 
299. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2012). 
300. See, e.g., Alan M. Garber & Sean R. Tunis, Does Comparative-Effectiveness Research 
Threaten Personalized Medicine?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1925 (2009) (describing the potential for 
CER to yield useful information personalized to a patient’s situation beyond the data typically 
obtained from traditional clinical trials). 
301. Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC 
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of people’s well-being, and it has shown that people often make 
systematic errors in choosing what will make them happy. 
The great breakthrough in studying human happiness came from a 
simple, but important insight into how to measure it. Scientists realized 
that the best way to know how happy or unhappy someone feels is to ask 
them.302 People’s answers reflect their “subjective well-being” (SWB), 
or how happy they feel about their own lives.303 
Researchers generally use one of two different sorts of techniques for 
measuring SWB. The first, known as Experience Sampling Methods 
(ESM), involve people using smartphones or handheld computers that 
periodically send them short questionnaires asking them what they are 
doing and how happy or unhappy they feel on a defined scale.304 The 
second class of techniques is known as Life Satisfaction (LS) surveys.305 
These are typically multi-item questionnaires that ask people, “[a]ll 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life these days?” LS 
surveys are often included as part of a longer survey about respondents’ 
age, health, income, and other demographics.306 
The two methods have different strengths and weaknesses. ESM 
surveys allow researchers to study more fine-grained aspects of people’s 
lives than do longer LS surveys that typically take place only once a 
year. ESM surveys avoid corruption from the biases associated with 
people’s memories or that occur when people focus on recent or 
particularly salient events.307 For instance, one concern is that surveys 
may incorporate a self-justification bias—that is, an individual who is 
asked how happy he is after having made a decision may justify that 
decision and believe the decision was more welfare-maximizing than it 
really was in part because it is the decision he made. Put another way, 
people may under-report the negative consequences of their own 
decision because they made the decision that imposed the suffering in 
                                                     
PSYCHOLOGY ix, ix (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999). 
302. Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National 
Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34, 34, 40 (2000). 
303. Id. at 34. 
304. Id. at 35. 
305. William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESSMENT 164, 164–65 (1993). 
306. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 Duke L.J. 
1509, 1512 (2013). 
307.  Christie N. Scollen et al., Experience Sampling: Promises and Pitfalls, Strengths and 
Weaknesses, 4 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 5, 12 (2003). 
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the first place.308 This is seemingly a reason to favor moment-by-
moment measures of welfare rather than measures that require memory. 
Self-justification bias is less likely to manifest if we ask how someone 
feels during the relevant period rather than if we ask him to reflect back 
after the fact. 
On the other hand, though, LS surveys allow researchers to track 
people over longer periods of time, enabling them to see people enter 
and exit pertinent life situations like marriage, the death of a loved one, 
or disability.309 
Importantly, despite different methodologies, the results of ESM and 
LS methods tend to correlate well with one another.310 In addition, they 
demonstrate other important signs of reliability and validity. For 
example, people’s self-reports of their own happiness correlate well with 
others’ judgments of their happiness, with how often they smile, with 
neurological data associated with pleasure, and with external features of 
their lives that are typically associated with happiness.311 These all 
support the notion that SWB surveys are measuring something real and 
measuring it fairly well.312 
Even if we can expect errors in predicting any one individual’s likely 
happiness by using this data, it can still provide valuable information. It 
is one thing to know whether patients who receive treatment A have 
higher survival rates than those who receive treatment B. Other aspects 
of those treatments, including pain, recuperation time, and cost, could 
produce meaningful welfare differences between them. Hedonic 
psychology can measure these differences. If treatment A has a five 
percent higher survival rate than treatment B but leads to substantially 
greater pain, longer amounts of time out of work, and substantially 
                                                     
308.  Those who really value choosing because they hate being told what to do might experience 
more relative happiness in the short-term that they chose their lot, even if it does not result longer 
term in the highest possible well-being. 
309.  Pavot & Diener, supra note 305, at 165. 
310.  See Ed Diener et al., The Satisfaction with Life Scale, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 1 
(1985). 
311.  See Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective 
Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11–13 (2006). 
312.  Although notions of human welfare are hotly debated, almost all accounts of welfare place 
strong emphasis on people’s experience of happiness, satisfaction, or well-being. John Bronsteen, 
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1590 
(2010).  
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greater costs to patients, those negative effects can be seen in patients’ 
self-reports about their experiences.313 
In many situations, outcome data and hedonic data will be aligned in 
predictions of which treatment choice will most improve well-being. 
Where that happens, selecting the default option that both methods agree 
on does not seem particularly controversial. Indeed, it may be hard to 
envision why such clear choices are not already presented to patients as 
the default. 
But we know they are not always presented as such. For instance, we 
know that today, many doctors suggest stents even though data suggest 
the procedure is unlikely to increase well-being.314 This is usually not 
because of some malevolent motive. Rather, it is a function of how the 
standard of practice evolves in health care—and of how the autonomy 
and custom and practice-based legal standards work. 
Assume a physician is taught one standard treatment option in 
medical school. Outcome data may, at some later point, suggest that a 
different treatment is better. But the original treatment that the doctor 
learned is likely to still be one that most doctors consider acceptable and 
the one with which a particular doctor may have the most comfort. 
Under the current regime, physicians must offer a wide range of options 
(whether the state standard for informed consent is physician-centered or 
patient-based). They cannot offer procedures that have clearly been 
proven not to work (e.g., leeches to treat tonsillitis), but as long as 
treatment options are medically acceptable and meet the minimum 
standards, these options are presented to patients. 
Accordingly, physicians do not necessarily present as the 
recommended option the one that data suggest to be the best for the 
patient.315 The principle of valuing patient autonomy (and of basing 
malpractice liability on custom and practice) gets in the way of 
congruence with the data and hampers suitably rapid change. 
Implementing the default regime would significantly improve this 
problem. 
                                                     
313. There is a similar movement underway in personalized medicine, which uses data to tailor 
treatments (and drugs through pharmacogenomics) based on an individual’s genetic profile. See, 
e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome 
Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2012). Data on 
individual differences drives choices in individual treatment. Id. 
314. See Lin, supra note 167, at 1621; Chou et. al, supra note 24, at 1070–73. 
315. For a discussion on evidence-based medicine, see Epstein, supra note 28, at 53–55. 
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Of course, these examples assume that data prove one treatment 
option to be “clearly” better than another. In the real world, one of the 
greatest difficulties will be determining when the data is strong enough 
to make one option “clearly” better than another. The status quo is 
tautological because we know the data are strong enough when standard 
practice changes to accord with that data. But to establish a default, the 
decision must be based on a review of data and not adoption of the 
practice. 
One answer is that as long as there are some commonly accepted 
yardsticks by which to measure medical outcomes, and some commonly 
accepted norms for how much data of certain types constitutes enough to 
have confidence in a conclusion, then it would be enough to determine 
when there is “clearly” a best option that should become the default. 
Many decisions will not be close calls. 
For ones that are, though, it is important to acknowledge that hard 
choices will have to be made. This does not prevent early 
experimentation with setting defaults when the choice is not a close call. 
Any early attempts to implement a default could focus on the easy cases 
and not the hard ones—where the difference between two common 
treatment options is so stark that there is great confidence in choosing 
one as the default. Ultimately, there will need to be some 
experimentation with this new regime to test effectiveness. Even if we 
can identify a smaller number of situations where patients tend to err in 
decision-making and start by implementing the default regime, there, we 
could see worthwhile improvements. 
In addition to cases where outcome data and hedonic data agree, there 
are also likely to be cases where hedonic data (but not traditional 
medical metrics) shows that one procedure is clearly better for most 
patients, but many patients would nonetheless choose the other 
procedure. Consider, for instance, what the medical field now calls 
“preference-sensitive” care. In these cases, health outcomes data cannot 
distinguish between the choices—for example, watchful waiting versus 
radiation versus radical prostatectomy for early stage prostate cancer.316 
But hedonic data might distinguish and might be a better basis on which 
to determine the default.317 
                                                     
316. See Fagerlin et al., supra note 156, at 616–19; Laakmann, supra note 27, at 923; Wennberg 
& Peters, supra note 27, at 928–29. 
317. A similar analysis would apply to cases where the hedonic data and outcomes data clearly 
conflict. 
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There are two main objections that scholars may have to the use of 
hedonic data. The first concerns the reliability of this data, particularly in 
its application to individual decision-making. Namely, sometimes people 
overwhelmingly are made happy or unhappy by an activity: driving in 
traffic is bad, and eating with friends is good. But other times, how an 
activity affects people’s happiness varies. Some people love shopping 
and hate snorkeling, whereas others hate shopping and love snorkeling. 
Hedonic averages will not necessarily pick up on these individual 
differences as to health care choices, whereas patient choice might. For 
example, if Option A is surgery and Option B is physical therapy 
requiring a lot of exercise, and a particular patient hates exercise, then 
his choice of surgery might reflect what is best for him hedonically more 
accurately than would a hedonic average that sets the default at Option 
B. 
Still, this challenge is not insurmountable. A well-designed well-
being analysis should be able to gauge whether the issues in question are 
more like driving in traffic or more like shopping. And as the analyses 
become more sophisticated, it should be easier to personalize the results 
when stable preferences would matter. For instance, a patient could be 
asked her feelings on exercise and that data could be input to generate 
the default option based on that patient’s preference (if the patient has 
one). In other words, to set the best possible default requires access to 
information about what makes a particular individual happiest. In an 
ideal future world, personalizing defaults with adequate data would be 
the best possible solution.318 
But even absent personalization of defaults, in most cases, data about 
things like adaptation would seem to be as valid and reliable as to any 
individual as the medical data that are commonly used. And particularly 
in situations where the medical data cannot help a patient decide, 
hedonic data are certainly better than nothing. Finally, even if the default 
as to any individual is wrong, the right to opt out is helpful. Patients 
could and probably would opt out of the default and make a different 
choice. 
The second potential objection is that individuals may have 
preferences for treatment that do not turn on their own well-being. 
Someone might prefer Y over X, where X is better for her well-being, 
because Y is better on other grounds, such as others’ well-being, 
religious values, etc. 
                                                     
318. See NUDGING HEALTH, supra note 174, at 241; supra note 293. 
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Again, though, this is why there is a right to opt out. Imagine a 
Jehovah’s Witness who is told she needs a blood transfusion and that the 
transfusion is the default treatment option for her condition—if she 
accepts the default, it will likely result in her greatest well-being. The 
data that generated that default would not have considered that this 
particular individual would actually experience reduced well-being from 
having accepted a blood transfusion in violation of the teachings of her 
religion. 
But the Jehovah’s Witness patient could simply opt out of the default. 
Absent perfect information and perfect personalization of the default, 
there will always be certain individuals for whom the default choice is 
not “right.” That is the case any time a default is implemented. But it is 
still legitimate to select the default that should be the best for most 
people, while permitting any individual to override the choice. 
Therefore, despite some challenges, the nudge solution to health care 
decision-making holds significant promise. The commitment to 
autonomy in health care decision-making came about, in part, because 
there were no better options. Paternalism was problematic. And at the 
time, no systematic way existed to measure internal mental states. The 
limits of individual rationality were also not well understood. The nudge 
solution presents an important opportunity to correct some of the 
enormous problems in patient decision-making identified above and 
ultimately to address the epidemics of overtreatment and mistreatment in 
the health care system.319 
Significant advances in hedonic psychology and in hedonic (and 
outcomes-based) data collection have been made and will continue to be 
made in coming years. Most experts expect that these efforts, as they 
become more sophisticated, will better focus on the individual, 
particularly in areas where individualized data seems most likely to 
affect treatment choice. Policymakers and lawmakers should be looking 
to harness that data to improve health care decision-making. The current 
network of patients, physicians, and insurance companies has proven 
unable to control not only the increasing cost of health care but also its 
ability to actually improve patient and social welfare.320 Situations such 
as these are ripe for legal intervention. 
                                                     
319. See supra notes 164–69. 
320. On the problem of incentives for proper treatment see Epstein, supra note 28, at 12. 
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CONCLUSION 
To an enormous extent, the field of health law scholarship is 
committed to autonomy both in its own right and as a tool for achieving 
patient well-being. Research on patient decision-making fundamentally 
undermines the latter, and it has brought the former into starker conflict 
with actual patient well-being. Providing a default treatment option will 
nudge many patients toward selecting the choice that will be best for 
them, while still respecting individual autonomy through a right to opt 
out. 
 
